02/23/2012

Saikrishna Prakash & Michael D. Ramsey: The Goldilocks Executive
Michael Ramsey

Saikrishna Prakash and I have posted on SSRN this review of Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule's book The Executive Unbound: After the Madisonian Republic (Oxford 2010).  We criticize Posner and Vermeule's view that the "Madisonian republic" – that is, the idea of an Executive operating within a constitutional system of separated powers – is obsolete;  we defend the modern relevance of what we believe to be the Framers' system of a robust Executive subject to legal constraint – a "Goldilocks executive" that is neither too powerful nor too weak.  The review, titled The Goldilocks Executive, is forthcoming in the Texas Law Review.

Here is the abstract:  

The Executive Unbound, by Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule, is terrific — thought provoking and refreshing. It is a challenging must-read for those who believe that the Executive can or must be reigned in by Congress or the courts and for those who believe that the Executive has improperly usurped the powers of the other branches, becoming the most roguish branch of government.

Posner and Vermeule have shown that the modern Executive is much less bound by law than in the past and that in general this may be for the good. But they have not shown that the Executive is wholly unbound by law, or that the Executive should be. Part I of our review describes the book’s central arguments and situates it within the executive power literature. Part II concludes that Posner and Vermeule substantially overstate the lack of constraint the Executive faces in the modern era. Part III considers The Executive Unbound as a normative argument for adopting a legally unbound executive and finds the case not proven. We tentatively conclude that separation of powers and related constraints play an important role in creating something of a “Goldilocks Executive”: an executive neither much too strong nor much too weak, but about right.

And here is the conclusion, which is a good summary of the review as a whole: 

The Executive Unbound rests on four claims, two descriptive and two normative. The descriptive claims are the book’s most prominent ones—that the modern Executive is unbound by law but bound by public opinion. The normative claims are more challenging and provocative—that a legally unbound executive is desirable because legal constraints generate suboptimal executive policies and that legal constraints are unnecessary because the restraints of public opinion are sufficient.

As a description of the modern executive, we think the book greatly overstates. It is true that the Executive wields greater power today than 200 years ago. The reasons for executive expansion are well-described in the book. But enhanced executive power does not equal unbound executive power. The basic Madisonian framework remains intact: the Constitution limits the powers the President can exercise; Congress and the courts wield powers that potentially or actually check the President. We agree that public opinion constrains the President, but even here the book may overstate by failing to appreciate the public’s preference for an executive bound by law. Because of this preference, public opinion reinforces legal constraints on the President while also providing additional political constraints. Thus, if the authors mean to say, as they appear to say in the conclusion, merely that legal constraints have weakened, we agree (but we do not think that claim is especially novel). If they mean to say—as they appear to say in the introduction—that legal constraints have vanished, we think their claim is manifestly implausible.

Stripped of its main descriptive point, the book becomes a normative argument for dismantling existing legal constraints on the Executive. This, it is said, will lead to better outcomes, especially in crises. But the book provides few, if any, concrete examples of constrained executive power leading to bad results. More significantly, the book argues forcefully that legal constraints on the Executive are worthless because there is no danger of executive tyranny. We remain skeptical. The book employs social science data to suggest that tyranny does not occur in wealthy democracies. But we find the data inconclusive and the historical record thin. And in any event, the concern is not just tyranny but executive overreaching and abuse.

In contrast, the current system of modest constraints on an energetic President seems the safer course. We are not persuaded that the trade-off between executive energy and executive constraint that the Framers identified has been rendered obsolete by modern developments. Although there will be various views of how the balance should be struck, some attempt to balance the two seems preferable to adopting one extreme. A system with a series of checks on a robust executive has stood the test of time, giving us something of a Goldilocks Executive. It should, we think, take powerful evidence for us to abandon it. Posner and Vermeule simply do not provide that powerful evidence. So while we might be better off with a stronger executive, and public opinion might be enough to prevent tyranny, we, at least, are unwilling to make the leap.

02/22/2012

Noah Feldman on the Insanity of Originalism
Mike Rappaport

Mike Ramsey recently linked to Noah Feldman's short essay about the declining influence of the United States Constitution on the rest of the world.  Mike noted that Feldman claimed that judicial review was somehow invented by John Marshall in Marbury v. Madison.  While Mike criticizes Feldman, I would go further and say that scholars today generally recognize that judicial review was a relatively common practice prior to the Constitution, that the framers expected it to be employed, and that the constitutional text contemplates it.  To mention just one article, Bill Treanor (no conservative and not an originalist, at least of the standard variety) notes that prior to the Constitution, there were at least "thirty-one cases in which a statute was invalidated and seven more in which, although the statute was upheld, one judge concluded that the statute was unconstitutional."  He concludes that Marbury built on a firm foundation of judicial review. 

Another part of Feldman's essay is even more worthy of note.  Feldman writes:

The truth is that no sane constitution-drafters would want the future court of their country to spend its time arguing about what they really meant -- or even about public perception of what they meant. Debates about what the Constitution originally meant become proxies for arguments about what the Constitution ought to mean. 

Perhaps Feldman is aware that James Madison, father of the Constitution, wrote that: 

I entirely concur in the propriety of resorting to the sense in which the Constitution was accepted and ratified by the nation.  In that sense alone it is the legitimate Constitution.  And if that be not the guide in expounding it, there can be no security for a consistent and stable . . . exercise of its powers.

I would add that the great majority of interpretive approaches of the Framers' generation, including the competing approaches of Hamilton and Jefferson, were some of type of originalism.  One might infer that Feldman believes that the Framers were not sane and that might then explain why Feldman recommends that other countries not follow the document that the Framers drafted.

Of course, Feldman has another point here.  He believes that people often use original meaning as proxies for their political views.  While he has a point here, I don't think this is quite right. Instead, I believe the more accurate way to put it is that people with different political views often end up concluding that the original meaning has different meanings.  That is not necessarily because they are viewing the evidence in bad faith, but they are unconsciously influenced by their political biases.

While I don't think we will ever get rid of differing views of the Constitution's meaning, I do believe that as more information about the original meaning is produced with the growth of originalism, more agreement will result.  I have certainly changed my mind about several important constitutional issues based on the evidence and I expect to continue to do so.  Hugo Black, who Feldman cites as an example of a liberal who used originalism to generate liberal results, was an originalist of sorts, but he was writing at a time when our knowledge about the Framing had been impoverished, in part by the New Deal.  Even then, he produced several conservative results based on originalism, such as his dissent in Griswold and his view that the Contract Clause should be enforced strictly.  While originalism may never work itself pure, it is likely to generate more agreement with further knowledge.      

(Crossposted at the Liberty Law Blog.)

Originalism on the Web
Michael Ramsey

Another great post from Lawrence Rosenthal in the Cato Unbound series on Substantive Due Process: Lawson on Original Meaning.

Is There an Originalist Case against Affirmative Action?
Michael Ramsey

The Supreme Court's grant of certiorari yesterday in Fisher v. University of Texas makes this post particularly timely...

At The Faculty Lounge, Alfred Brophy: Starkey on Inconsistent Originalism.

Professor Brophy's post highlights a 2010 article by Brando Starkey (Villanova Law): Inconsistent Originalism and the Need for Equal Protection Re-Invigoration, which among other things makes the recurring critique that Justices Scalia and Thomas (and their originalist academic allies) have not made much of an originalist case against affirmative action.   From Professor Starkey's abstract:

I argue that the Fourteenth Amendment’s original understanding is an anachronism and the future of the intent doctrine must not hinge on the ratifying generation’s formulation. Originalists implicitly agree with this contention. Indeed, Originalists’ equal protection opinions, particularly involving affirmative action, confound anyone with a basic knowledge of the Fourteenth Amendment’s legislative history. Originalists best establish how much the original understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment is unhelpful in dealing with contemporary race issues.

Professor Brophy comments in part:

I continue to be surprised by the extent to which talk of originalism dominates our thinking, but as Brando points out one looking towards an expanded equal protection principle probably needs to deal with rather circumscribed original meaning.  What he does here is point out that sometimes we depart from original understanding -- such as the argument that the fourteenth amendment was colorblind, when substantial evidence suggests that it do not originally prohibit segregated schools.  Pointing out this inconsistency is an important (if somewhat dicey) proposition -- for it argues that the Fourteenth Amendment allows race-conscious discrimination.  All of that goes to show that originalists have departed in certain circumstances from what originalism counsels.  If they have done so in some cases, then perhaps they should do so in others....  There is a lot to this article; I hope you have the chance to read it.

My view is that the failure adequately to explain the anti-affirmative action decisions on originalist grounds is a serious weakness in the Scalia/Thomas jurisprudence.  (I'm not saying they can't be so explained, only that they haven't been).  If I'm overlooking important originalist scholarship on this issue please let me know.  With the Fisher case coming up next Term, this is a good time for originalists who care about this issue to get to work.

02/21/2012

Larry Solum's "Legal Theory Lexicon" Defines "Originalism"
Michael Ramsey

Lawrence Solum: Legal Theory Lexicon: Originalism.

From the introduction:

There are many different theories of constitutional interpretation, but the most controversial and also perhaps the most influential is "originalism"--actually a family of constitutional theories. The idea that courts would look to evidence from the constitutional convention, the ratification debates,The Federalist Papers, and the historical practice shortly after ratification of the Constitution of 1789 (or to equivalent sources for amendments) is an old one. This post provides a very brief introduction to "originalism" that is aimed at law students (especially first-year law students) with an interest in legal theory.

Actually it's a great overview for anyone interested in originalism, even those who have been thinking about it for along time.

02/20/2012

Updates: Substantive Due Process, Kersch on Wilkinson, and Further Thoughts from Hadley Arkes
Michael Ramsey

Several conversations I noted earlier have interesting further developments.

(1)  Cato Unbound has a series of responses to the initial essays (noted here and here) on substantive due process by Timothy Sandefur, Ryan Williams, Gary Lawson and Lawrence Rosenthal.

(2)  At Balkinization, Ken Kersch comments on J. Harvie Wilkinson’s new book Cosmic Constitutional Theory (noted here).

(3)  At Library of Law and Liberty, Hadley Arkes has further thoughts on the discussion provoked by my review of his book Constitutional Illusions and Anchoring Truths: he asks Could We Be in Heated Agreement? (note: I'm not convinced he and I are in heated agreement, but I've resolved to give him the last word in this exchange).  The complete series of posts is:

Thanks to the Library of Law and Liberty and especially to Richard Reinsch for encouraging this discussion. 

Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison: Historical Gloss and the Separation of Powers
Michael Ramsey

Curtis A. Bradley (Duke University - School of Law) and Trevor W. Morrison (Columbia University - Law School) have posted Historical Gloss and the Separation of Powers on SSRN.  Here is the abstract:

Arguments based on historical practice are a mainstay of debates about the constitutional separation of powers. Surprisingly, however, there has been little sustained academic attention to the proper role of historical practice in this context. The scant existing scholarship is either limited to specific subject areas or focused primarily on judicial doctrine without addressing the use of historical practice in broader conceptual or theoretical terms. To the extent that the issue has been discussed, most accounts of how historical practice should inform the separation of powers require “acquiescence” by the branch of government whose prerogatives the practice implicates, something that is viewed as critical to giving historical practice the force of law. Yet the concept of acquiescence has been treated much too casually in the literature. Claims about acquiescence are typically premised on a Madisonian conception of interbranch competition, pursuant to which Congress and the Executive Branch are each assumed to have the tools and the motivation consistently to guard against encroachments on their authority. It has become apparent from political science scholarship, however, that the Madisonian model does not accurately reflect the dynamics of modern congressional-executive relations. This requires a reexamination of the premises and implications of the idea of institutional acquiescence in particular, and of the role of historical practice more generally. Ultimately, we argue, the problems with the Madisonian model are not fatal to crediting historical practice in interpreting the separation of powers. But they do require more attention to the reasons why such practice is invoked, the extent to which the reasons demand institutional acquiescence, and the precise method by which such acquiescence is identified. To illustrate the importance of each of these questions, we present three case studies of constitutional debates concerning the separation of powers in which practice-based arguments are prominent - war powers, congressional-executive agreements, and removal of executive officers.

Thanks to Legal History Blog, where Mary Dudziak comments: “Along the way, Bradley and Morrison have a helpful discussion of the relationship between historical data and arguments about constitutional interpretation and judicial review, noting that ‘not all approaches to constitutional interpretation,’ including some forms of originalism, ‘can easily coexist with arguments from historical practice.’ See pp. 10-15.”

02/19/2012

Originalism on the Web
Michael Ramsey

Robert G. Natelson: Independence Institute files unique Supreme Court brief in Obamacare case.

Professor Natelson notes:

We have just filed an amicus curiae (”friend of the court”) brief with the Supreme Court arguing that (1) under current Supreme Court rulings, Obamacare’s individual mandate, if it can be justified at all, must be justified under the Constitution’s Necessary and Proper Clause, and (2) scholarly research into the meaning of the Necessary and Proper Clause shows that it is not broad enough to empower Congress to adopt the mandate.

The brief is based largely on a recent book I co-authored with three noted constitutional scholars, Gary Lawson, Geoffrey Miller, and Guy Seidman [Ed.: The Origins of the Necessary and Proper Clause, Cambridge University Press, 2010].   All four of us have disparate political views, but all of our research converged on the issue of what the Founders intended the Necessary and Proper Clause to mean.

Originalism on the Web
Michael Ramsey

Timothy N. Baldwin: Montana AG Steve Bullock: An Original Intentionalist or Living Constitutionalist.

More discussion of originalism at the state law level.  (I would note, though, that the article's principal criticism of Steve Bullock -- whom I had not heard of before this moment -- appears to be that he failed to resist enforcement of federal marijuana laws in 2011; that of course was after the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Gonzales v. Raich, so it's a little unclear what the author thinks Mr. Bullock should have done.).

02/18/2012

Originalism on the Web
Michael Ramsey

Noah Feldman: Ginsburg's right, U.S. Constitution is a bad model (commenting on the study by David Law and Mila Versteeg noted here, and making a somewhat strained argument against originalism).

As an aside, as a follow-up to my recent post on Marbury, I note that Professor Feldman says that the practice of judicial review "is an innovation introduced in 1803 by the Supreme Court under Chief Justice John Marshall in the now famous case of Marbury v. Madison."  I'm sure Professor Feldman is aware of the widespread assumptions regarding judicial review before Marbury, but loose language like this contributes to the idea that judicial review lacks originalist foundations.  The short of it is that Marbury may have been the first case to explain and justify judicial review, but the idea is well reflected in founding era writings (including those of Madison and Jefferson I noted previously, as well as of course Hamilton's Federalist 78).

RELATED, on the Marbury point: via the Legal History Blog, Keith Whittington (Princeton Political Science) and Amanda Rinderle have posted Making a Mountain Out of a Molehill? Marbury and the Construction of the Constitutional Canon (forthcoming, Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly) on SSRN.  Here is the abstract:

How important was Marbury v. Madison in American constitutional history? This article examines judicial, legislative and executive citations and legal commentary to show that Marbury did not enter the constitutional canon as the fountainhead of judicial review until the turn of the twentieth century. In doing so, it reveals the process by which historical memories are constructed and adds to our understanding about the diverse sources of judicial review in the early republic and the rhetoric of judicial authority.

My speculation would be that Marbury wasn't initially regarded as all that significant because it wasn't thought to break new ground on this point, consistent with my view that some form of judicial review was generally understood to be implicit in Article III and Article VI.

02/17/2012

J. Harvie Wilkinson on Judicial Restraint
Michael Ramsey

J. Harvie Wilkinson (U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit) has posted an except from his new book Cosmic Constitutional Theory: Why Americans Are Losing Their Inalienable Right to Self-Governance (Oxford University Press) at Balkinization.

Here is the book description from Amazon:

American constitutional law has undergone a transformation. Issues once left to the people have increasingly become the province of the courts. Subjects as diverse as abortion rights and firearms regulations, health care reform and counterterrorism efforts, not to mention a millennial presidential election, are more and more the domain of judges.

What sparked this development? In this engaging volume, Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson argues that America's most brilliant legal minds have launched a set of cosmic constitutional theories that, for all their value, are undermining self-governance. Thinkers as diverse as Justices William Brennan and Antonin Scalia, Professor John Hart Ely, Judges Robert Bork and Richard Posner, have all produced seminal interpretations of our Founding document, but ones that promise to imbue courts with unprecedented powers. While crediting the theorists for the sparkling quality of their thoughts, Judge Wilkinson argues they will slowly erode the role of representative institutions in America and leave our children bereft of democratic liberty.

The loser in all the theoretical fireworks is the old and honorable tradition of judicial restraint. The judicial modesty once practiced by Learned Hand, John Harlan, and Oliver Wendell Holmes has given way to competing schools of liberal and conservative activism seeking sanctuary in Living Constitutionalism, Originalism, Process Theory, or the supposedly anti-theoretical creed of Pragmatism. Each of these seemingly disparate theories promises their followers an intellectually respectable route to congenial political outcomes from the bench. Judge Wilkinson calls for a plainer, simpler, self-disciplined commitment to judicial restraint and democratic governance, a course that alas may be impossible so long as the cosmic constitutionalists so dominate contemporary legal thought.

Gerard Magliocca comments here:

I highly recommend Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson's book on "Cosmic Constitutional Theory." It provides a lucid and accessible discussion of the four leading schools of interpretation: (1) living constitutionalism; (2) originalism; (3) political process theory; and (4) pragmatism. In each of these four chapters, the advantages and disadvantages of the model under consideration are examined with care. The chapter on pragmatism (in other words, what Richard Posner says) is especially compelling because Posner's constitutional approach is not usually examined with the same rigor that is applied to his other views. Furthermore, I enjoyed the book because I share Judge Wilkinson's skepticism about normative constitutional theory.

Nevertheless, I do have a bone to pick. Wilkinson introduces and concludes his analysis by advocating judicial restraint as superior to any comprehensive system of constitutional interpretation. This raises a question--why isn't judicial restraint also a cosmic theory? …

02/16/2012

Saul Cornell Comments on the 14th Amendment and Originalist Method
Michael Ramsey

Saul Cornell (Fordham History) emails in response to this post:

Interesting recent  posts on the 14th Amendment. I think you and Dave Kopel [ed: see here]are misreading the evidence and this highlights a problem with  originalist method. Kopel's evidence shows that there was a disagreement over the original meaning among courts which raises the basic question of how we choose among the range of the different possible meanings from any historical moment.  Your post also raises questions about what we mean by public meaning. Reconstructing what judges thought is not evidence of original public meaning, but evidence of  judicial understanding at a particular historical moment.  Judicial method, which obviously is not static, generally follows a set of formal rules. Reading a text in this fashion is actually quite distinct from original public meaning  understood as ordinary meaning-- a point I  stress in my recent article [ed.: see here; this is an important recent article in the Yale Journal of Law and Humanities]. Public meaning generally eschews the technical methods of the law.   How do we choose among these methods and what are the rules for a given method at particular moment in time? This  brings us back to intellectual history.   Originalists don't have a  rigorous method to deal with these issues.    Until they develop a real historical method originalists will continue to talk past one another and anyone playing the originalist game will be able to cherry pick evidence to produce the result they find most congenial by simply claiming it was part of the original meaning or what a fully informed reader would have taken that meaning to be during the Founding era or during Reconstruction.

UPDATE:  Two quick clarifications -- (1) I did not mean to endorse David Kopel's argument, apart from saying that it raised legitimate questions.  I don't have definite views about the original meaning of any part of the 14th Amendment other than the birthright citizenship issue.  (2) I did not mean to endorse the use of post-ratification judicial decisions as a principal authority on original meaning.  Judges are not neutral interpreters; they bring their own personal and political contexts with them.  What they say is some evidence of how legal language is understood, nothing more.  For example, in the birthright citizenship debate, I think it's notable but hardly decisive that the Supreme Court's majority in the Slaughterhouse Cases said that the 14th Amendment did not convey citizenship on children of aliens.  Again, all I meant to say regarding bans on cross-racial marriage is that Professor Kopel raises some doubts about their constitutionality under the original meaning, and I think the judicial opinions he cites do that.

On the broader point, I think Professor Cornell is right to ask originalists to clarify what they are looking for in looking for the original meaning (and that this may be difficult).  We had some discussion of this point at the recent works-in-progress conference in connection with Professor Somin's paper on political ignorance, which expressed doubt that there was a common understanding among ordinary people of the time regarding much constitutional meaning.  One response was that the Constitution as a legal document should be given a meaning consistent with ordinary legal usage of the time, not necessarily ordinary public usage (just as a scientific writing would be given a meaning consistent with ordinary scientific usage even if that meaning was not popularly understood).  Another response was that the views of legal elites could be used as a proxy for common understanding, or at least what the common understanding would be if the common person educated himself about the topic.  I don't think either of these points would satisfy Professor Cornell though.

I might suggest as well that I'm not sure the question has practical force in at least some situations.  Consider presidential war powers, which I've studied a fair amount.  My view is that the educated understanding of the declare war clause was that the President could not initiate hostilities without congressional approval.  Was there a common understanding among ordinary people to the contrary?  I don't know (and I'm not sure how we would find out -- the reality is that the educated understanding is mostly what has survived).  I'm surely in favor of additional research on the subject.  But I'm skeptical that there is such contrary evidence.  I think it pretty unlikely that the legal understanding diverged from the common understanding on this point (not least because, if there was a common understanding supporting presidential power, legal elites who supported presidential power, such as Hamilton, likely would have appealed to it).  I'm curious how Professor Cornell thinks his critique plays out in the war powers context.

Originalism on the Web: Robert VerBruggen on Balkin's Living Originalism
Michael Ramsey

In the Washington Times, Robert VerBruggen reviews Living Originalism by Jack Balkin: The original, living Constitution?

02/15/2012

The Tragedy of Nonoriginalism and Substantive Due Process
Mike Rappaport

The principal comments on Tim Sandefur's essay on substantive due process are in.  From an originalist perspective, the comments by Ryan Williams and Gary Lawson are particularly instructive.  Williams uncovers new evidence of the understandings of substantive due process at the time of the 14th Amendment's framing.  Lawson relies on new evidence concerning the powers of Congress under the Necessary and Proper Clause -- evidence that the Congress was a fiduciary and therefore bound by the limitations of a fiduciary.   (Lawrence Rosenthal's comments are also interesting, but do not reflect new evidence on the original meaning, which is my focus here.) 

What this new evidence shows is that our understanding of the original meaning of the Constitution's clauses is in a pretty elemental state.  The reason for this is that for the last 75 years or so, when academic work was conducted, academics have not been very interested in the Constitution's original meaning. Taking their lead from the legal culture and the Supreme Court's nonoriginalism, legal academics looked at other matters.  Consequently, we have very limited knowledge of the original meaning of many of the Constitution's significant clauses.

The nonoriginalism of this period is a genuine tragedy.  Most importantly, as I have argued elsewhere, it has deprived the nation of the constitutional amendments that would have been passed had the Court not engaged in judicial updating.  But also important is that our understanding of the original meaning has been impoverished because of this neglect of originalism.  We are now learning things at a very fast pace, but we still have 75 years to catch up on.

(Cross-posted at the Liberty Law Blog)

New Book: Elizabeth Price Foley's The Tea Party
Michael Ramsey

Elizabeth Price Foley, the Institute for Justice Chair in Constitutional Litigation and Professor of Law at Florida International University College of Law, has a new book from Cambridge University Press: The Tea Party: Three Principles.   Here is the book description from amazon:

In The Tea Party: Three Principles, Elizabeth Price Foley asserts that the mainstream media's characterization of the American Tea Party movement is distorted. Foley sees the decentralized, wide-ranging group as a movement bound by allegiance to three "core principles" of American constitutional law: limited government, unapologetic U.S. sovereignty, and constitutional originalism. She explains how these principles predict the Tea Party's impact on the American political landscape, connecting them to current issues, such as health care reform, illegal immigration, the war on terror, and internationalism.

The book has a formidable set of endorsements:

At last, someone conversant with the large issues now roiling contemporary American politics has taken the Tea Party seriously and concluded that it is intellectually substantial and politically constructive. Elizabeth Price Foley, one of today's most stimulating writers on constitutional law, finds much to admire in the Tea Party's coherent braiding of three themes-limited government, constitutional originalism, and an unapologetic defense of U.S. sovereignty."  - George F. Will

"Lambasted by the left, maligned by the media, the Tea Party may be the political phenomenon of the decade. No one has captured the energy and essence of this vital movement better than Elizabeth Price Foley. She combines scholarship and lucid writing with a profound respect - embraced by the Tea Party - for the U.S. Constitution as it was originally crafted to secure individual liberty and restrain government power. While I might quarrel with Prof. Foley's enthusiasm for America's muscular global role, her intellectual defense of the Tea Party and her application of its credo to urgent and controversial issues have produced a powerful, provocative, and timely book, which I highly recommend."  - Robert A. Levy, Chairman, Cato Institute

"Elizabeth Price Foley has produced an interesting and important work on the constitutional basis for the agenda of the Tea Party movement.... I do believe anyone interested in understanding how the growth of the welfare-regulatory state violates the constitution and threatens liberty can benefit from reading this book."  - Ron Paul, United States Congressman (R-TX)

"Elizabeth Price Foley's The Tea Party is a clear and straightforward explication of what the Tea Party Movement is all about, and is required reading for anyone who wants to understand the current political climate. With this slim, provocative volume, Foley once again demonstrates why she is one of constitutional law's rising stars."  - Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Beauchamp Brogan Distinguished Professor of Law, University of Tennessee College of Law

“By elevating principle above party, the Tea Party has already changed the face of American politics. In this marvelous book, Elizabeth Price Foley clearly identifies and defends the three basic principles that unite the Tea Party movement, all stemming from its commitment to our written Constitution. Politicos beware; the party has just begun.” – Randy E. Barnett, Professor of Constitutional Law, Georgetown Law Center, and author of Restoring the Lost Constitution: The Presumption of Liberty (2005)

Thanks to Instapundit for the pointer.

02/14/2012

Originalism in the Blogs: Michael Stern on Recess Appointments
Michael Ramsey

At Point of Order, Michael Stern has an interesting series of posts on the Recess Appointments Clause:

So About that Recess Appointments Clause

The Recess Appointments Clause and the War of 1812

The Recess Appointments Clause, Original Vacancies and Attorney General Wirt.

(The last cites Mike Rappaport's definitive article on the subject).

02/13/2012

A Response to Tim Sandefur's Views on Substantive Due Process
Mike Rappaport

In a previous post, I reviewed Tim Sandefur’s Cato Unbound essay on substantive due process.  I wrote:

Tim’s piece is interesting, but his interpretation of the Constitution is too abstract for my tastes.  I believe that the original meaning requires that one stay close to the original materials and only apply abstract principles if one finds those principles in the original materials.  See here.

Tim responded in e mail:

But if you'll check out the law review article I'm summarizing, you'll see I root my argument VERY deeply in founding-era writings, perhaps excessively so. Due to space constraints I had to leave this out, mostly, in the Cato Unbound piece. . . .  But I definitely do "stay close to the original materials and only apply abstract principles if one finds those principles in the original materials," showing how my argument is based on Madison, Hamilton, Paine, Milton, Jefferson, and even Aristotle. I'm not sure that makes me an "originalist" per se, but I'm certainly not just abstracting.

I appreciate Tim’s response, and readers should look at both his Cato Unbound Piece and his longer law review article.  But let me explain why I object to Tim’s interpretive approach.

One can distinguish between three different ways of interpreting the Constitution.  First, one can have an approach that seeks very hard to find out how a reasonable person at the time would have understood constitutional clauses in context.  In undertaking this task, one looks for the best evidence of how people at the time would have and actually understood the clauses.  This is my approach.  In employing this approach, one would look both at evidence of ordinary meaning and of legal meaning.  As I stated in my prior post, I believe that Ryan Williams has done a great job of using this approach to show how people at the time of the 5th and 14th Amendments would have understood the term “due process of law” and why they probably would not have found a substantive component in 1789 but would have found one in 1866.

I think it is clear that Tim’s article does not engage in this task.  To mention just aspect of of his piece, Tim finds some evidence in Coke, argues that various framers learned their law from Coke’s treatise, and then infers that “due process of law” would have been understood as prohibiting arbitrary action.  He does not wrestle with Ryan Williams’s evidence.  Instead, he prefers to operate on a more abstract level, but without justifying that that is how people at the time would have understood the provision.  As he states: “Ryan William lays out what he takes to be various readings of the Due Process Clause.  My point here is to emphasize the connections or overlaps of these readings.  In my view, each is a way of defining and preventing government arbitrariness.”  But one cannot simply look at specific meanings and then infer a general principle if people at the time did not do this.

Second, one might have an approach that seeks the original meaning, but does so in a way that is disposed to find a minimalist originalist meaning.  Jack Balkin is one leading practitioner of this approach.  This approach is originalist in the sense that one looks for the original meaning.  I do not find it persuasive because I believe its minimalist preconceptions leads it to ignore important pieces of evidence of the original meaning.  Under this approach, one can as a matter of construction (rather than interpretation) use one’s political theory and other guides to fill in the details of the abstract original meaning.  While Balkin is a modern liberal, libertarians could use this approach to argue for a libertarian gloss on the Constitution, but I don’t think Tim is doing this.

Finally, there is the approach that I believe Tim is employing.  This is the approach that I think most libertarians employed before Randy Barnett’s influential move towards originalism.  I have never really understood this approach.  As best as I can make it out, this approach basically attempts to find libertarian principles in the historical materials.  While such principles can sometimes be found, the method does not attempt to argue that this was the original meaning of the provisions.  Nor does it attempt to deny that nonlibertarian principles can also be found in the historical materials.  Why, then, one should follow the libertarian principles rather than the nonlibertarian ones, except for a preference for libertarianism, is not clear. Put differently, it is not clear why anyone would regard this as law, rather than political theory, and if it is political theory, why finding it in the historical materials matters very much.  I genuinely would like to know the answers to these questions.

I don’t want to be too critical of Tim.  But my first criticism was short and so I thought I would spell out some concerns that I have had for many years about the approach many libertarians take to constitutional interpretation.  I am quite interested in their response, not least because I also consider myself a libertarian.

Frederick Mark Gedicks: Establishment Clause Incorporation
Michael Ramsey

Frederick Mark Gedicks (Brigham Young University - J. Reuben Clark Law School) has posted Establishment Clause Incorporation: A Logical, Textual, and Historical Defense on SSRN. Here is the abstract:

Incorporation of the Establishment Clause against the states is logically and textually impossible — so say most academics, many lower-court judges, and a Supreme Court justice. They maintain that because the Clause was originally understood as a mere structural protection of state power, it cannot coherently restrain state power or protect a personal due process liberty as required for incorporation. Anti-incorporationists also seem to think that the purported incoherence and textual inconsistency of Establishment Clause incorporation excuse serious engagement of Reconstruction history, since they ignore it except for the irrelevant Blaine Amendment defeated as the Reconstruction era ended.

If anti-incorporation critics are right, the entire body of Establishment Clause doctrine is doomed: Nearly every Supreme Court decision interpreting the Clause has involved a challenge to state action. Establishment Clause doctrine thus cries out for an account of its incorporation against the states that is both logically coherent and consistent with the liberty-protecting text of the 14th Amendment.

Even defenders of Establishment Clause incorporation concede the anti-incorporationist critique. They argue instead that by the time the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, the meaning of the Clause had evolved from a structural reservation of state power to a personal right susceptible of incorporation. The ambiguous historical evidence for this textual evolution, however, combined with its abandonment of the original 18th century meaning of the Clause, have blocked acceptance of “evolved meaning” as the justification for Establishment Clause incorporation.

This Essay sets forth a logical and textual account of Establishment Clause incorporation based on the original 18th century understanding of the Clause. The Establishment Clause did not reserve state power, but disabled congressional action. As a disability on Congress, the Clause necessarily generated two correlative immunities, one held by the states against congressional interference with state decisions about establishment or disestablishment of religion, and one held by the people against congressional establishment of a national religion. The Fourteenth Amendment extinguished the state immunity, but extended the popular immunity to protect the people against state as well as federally established religions. This is logically coherene — specially given Reconstruction’s preoccupation with reordering federal-state relations — and also sounds in the personal liberty protected by the 14th Amendment Due Process Clause. When framed by a logical and textual account of Establishment Clause incorporation, the Reconstruction history ignored by anti-incorporationists shows considerable support for incorporation.

02/12/2012

Further Thoughts on Professor Arkes and Natural Law Adjudication
Michael Ramsey

Hadley Arkes has posted a thoughtful and graceful response to my review of his book Constitutional Illusions and Anchoring Truths.  Without, I hope, unduly prolonging the discussion or repeating what I wrote earlier, here are a few further thoughts on the questions he puts directly to me. 

It may be true that we must often look to background principles to understand the text – as Professor Arkes puts it, “the task of judging cases will persistently draw us back to those principles that were there before the text was made.”  There remain (at least) two different ways to understand those principles – as the people who drafted and ratified the language in question understood them, or as we now think they are best understood.  I don’t think these are the same, or collapse into one other.

Professor Arkes writes:

I recalled to my friend [Justice Scalia] that in the arguments in the Senate over the Fourteenth Amendment, Lyman Trumbull had to assure his colleagues that nothing in that proffered Amendment would challenge those laws in Illinois as well as Virginia that barred marriage across racial lines.  And it was as clear that, if he couldn’t offer those assurances, there was no way that the Fourteenth Amendment would stand a chance of passing.   Well does that mean that the Court should not have taken the case in Loving v. Virginia?  That it should have held back from striking down the laws on miscegenation?   I put the question to my friend, and he was honest enough to say that he would have to think about it.  But I can’t imagine he would finally say that Loving v. Virginia had been improvidently accepted for argument and wrongly decided.   My hunch—subject to correction—is that Prof. Ramsey would not make that move either.

But in that case we would put the question:  How would he or Justice Scalia make that decision in Loving without appealing to a deeper principle on the wrongness of racial discrimination– even though the implications of that principle had not recognized and accepted at the time?   As I’ve pointed in other places, it is no knock on Lyman Trumbull that he didn’t see all of the implications springing from the principles he was articulating in the Fourteenth Amendment.  After all the life of moral experience is a life of often discovering the implications of our own principles, principles that have heretofore gone unnoticed.

I would say that there are two steps to the analysis.  We can begin by asking, did the Fourteenth Amendment’s language, as it was best understood in the 1860s, prohibit bans on cross-racial marriage?  (I’m glossing over some methodological questions about exactly what we would be asking and how we would be answering it; I don’t think those are relevant for present purposes).  This is just a historical question, akin to asking whether the unamended Constitution or the constitution of the Confederacy contained such a rule.

Not being a Fourteenth Amendment scholar (at least apart from the first sentence), I’m not sure of the answer; I don’t think Trumbull’s statement alone settles it, and David Kopel has a great recent post on how early post-ratification judicial decisions actually found against the bans.  I’d need to know more about the common understanding of “equal protection” (assuming that is the language that matters) and its relationship to cross-racial marriage bans at the relevant times.  I think it quite possible that the public meaning of the phrase at the time did preclude the bans (and Trumbull was lying, or kidding himself).  In any event, these are historical questions; they don't turn on what I think the right moral principle is.

To avoid fighting Professor Arkes' hypothetical, let’s assume it’s clear that, as mid-nineteenth-century Americans understood the meaning of equality, it didn’t forbid bans on cross-racial marriage.  The second question is what, normatively, to do with that (hypothetical) conclusion.  Obviously if we are talking about the Confederate constitution we wouldn’t do anything with it, because it’s just a historical artifact.  There’s a normative dilemma because we regard the Fourteenth Amendment, in some sense, as a source of law today.  For the positivist/originalist of Justice Scalia’s view, I would think the answer is nonetheless to apply the Amendment’s equality principle as its enactors understood it.  (True, this may lead to unpalatable results.  That is one of the difficulties with positivist originalism; if you don’t encounter this problem at least part of the time, you probably aren’t doing it right).

In contrast, as I understand it, the natural law position is that there is a true meaning of equality incorporated in the Fourteenth Amendment which we can discover through reason irrespective of (and perhaps contradictory to) the nineteenth-century view of the matter.  What matters for this position is not what equality was understood to mean at the time of enactment, but what we now understand equality to mean.  (I recognize that under a natural law approach it isn’t the nature of equality that’s changed, but rather our understanding of it).

These seem to me to be two distinct positions, both understandable on their own terms, but asking very different questions.  To the extent Professor Arkes tries to blend the two, I don’t follow him.  I have no reason to suppose that the mid-nineteenth century understanding of equality was necessarily the same as mine.  That being so, I can pick one or the other, but when they diverge, there remains a choice to be made.  Which is the right approach for modern adjudication is, of course, another question (and one on which I didn’t express an opinion in the review).

Now I’ll turn to a second point that Professor Arkes resists: that there is an affinity between the natural law protection of cross-racial marriage in Loving v. Virginia and (some) modern arguments that the Fourteenth Amendment protects same-sex marriage.  Professor Arkes says the difference between his view of Loving and others’ view of same-sex marriage is that “one of us has it right and the other wrong[,] [t]hat one set of reasons is in fact better, more defensible, than the other[.]”  Perhaps so (though I don’t find his brief statement of natural law arguments against same-sex marriage very persuasive); but that response doesn’t address my point that the structure of the arguments is the same – both approach the Constitution in the same way.  They take the language of the Amendment to stand for a principle which they elaborate (well or poorly) without being bound by the way the enactors of that language understood it.  I’m not saying (here) that there’s anything wrong with that; I’m just saying that it leads to a Constitution that as a practical matter evolves as our understanding of true principles evolves.  And also as a practical matter, in a world of aggressive judicial review it leads to a Constitution given meaning according to the moral reasoning of modern judges. 

A quick final point:  Professor Arkes writes,

The judges are told [by positivists] to avoid moral reasoning because they cannot be sure that they are reasoning rightly.  But then how do they know that they have reasoned rightly about that principle asserting, as an anchoring point, their incapacity to reason rightly?   Prof. Ramsey suggests that the question is, “are we better off” when judges take seriously this need to engage in moral reasoning?   Is he pointing to some standard of utility?:  “Act utility,” “Rule utility”–or some other standard?   What is the principle? And where in the Constitution does he find it?

I agree that ultimately the choice of positivism versus natural law (versus other approaches) in constitutional adjudication is in a sense extraconstitutional (some originalists would disagree, I think).  As I said in my review, I think it comes down to what role we want judges to play in our society.  That is a question of principle (and various principles might apply -- I'm not sure why I'm called on to defend one in particular).  I don’t think that means positivism dissolves into self-contradiction; there are non-positivist reasons we might want positivist rather than naturalist judges.

02/11/2012

Ryan Williams on Substantive Due Process
Michael Ramsey

At Cato Unbound, Ryan Williams has posted his response to Timothy Sandefur, Substantive Due Process in Historical Context, as part of the debate I noted earlier.

RELATED:  Mike Rappaport comments at the Liberty Law Blog.

A Response on Originalism and United States v. Jones
Garrett Epps

[Editor's note:  Garrett Epps, Professor of Law at the University of Baltimore, asked that I post the following response to this post in which I criticized his reaction to United States v. Jones (the GPS tracking case).  I am always happy to post responses to anything we write (just email me).  That goes especially for strongly worded resposes, well-designed to stir things up.  So, here's Professor Epps (I do have a few thoughts in response to his response, but for now the stage is his).   --Michael Ramsey]

Michael Ramsey accuses me of “anti-originalism” because of an irreverent column on theatlantic.com about Justice Scalia’s opinion in United States v. Jones.

I wrote:

Justice Scalia's opinion  . . . focused like a laser on the least interesting or significant aspect of a fascinating case. Writing for five justices, he held that the government loses not because tracking people with a GPS is so intrusive that it should only be done with a warrant -- that issue is left undecided -- but because the police officers physically put something on the defendant's car. Justice Samuel Alito, whose concurrence was joined by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, and Elena Kagan, retorted: “the Court's reasoning largely disregards what is really important (the use of a GPS for the purpose of long-term tracking) and instead attaches great significance to something that most would view as relatively minor (attaching to the bottom of a car a small, light object that does not interfere in any way with the car's operation).” The actual physical act of attaching a tiny transmitter is so minor that it would not, under today's law, be regarded as a trespass, Alito said.  . . .

Scalia's opinion for the Court tried to deal with global satellite and massive computer technology with "originalist" methods: what would the Founding Fathers have thought if a colonial-era sheriff had tracked a bad guy by hiding a constable in his carriage. Seriously, grandpa? Alito retorted. “This would have required either a gigantic coach, a very tiny constable, or both -- not to mention a constable with incredible fortitude and patience.”

On the basis of the above, Ramsey accuses me, without limitation, of hypocrisy, heresy, and—most cuttingly—of “living constitutionalism”:

[A]ssuming Scalia is right about the 18th-century rule, his originalist point is that that’s the rule we have, until we change it in the prescribed way.  Professor Epps says this is the wrong approach.  But what’s his alternative?  I assume it’s to have judges decide for themselves what the best modern approach should be, taking into account modern circumstances and sensibilities (which basically means doing what they think best).  So really all Professor Epps is saying is that we should be ruled by modern judges, rather than by the framers’ rules.  That’s the fundamental divide between originalists and advocates of a living Constitution. If that is what Professor Epps is saying, here’s why I’m surprised to hear him say it: Not long ago he was arguing that children of illegal aliens, if born in the United States, are constitutionally entitled to U.S. citizenship by the first sentence of the Fourteenth Amendment.  (I agree.)  But that is a claim that we should be governed by rules laid down in the past by people who didn’t understand modern conditions.  We could instead say that modern judges should be free to decide the birthright citizenship issue in light of modern circumstances (that is, however they think best).  The framers of the Fourteenth Amendment didn’t know about mass illegal immigration, just as the framers of the Fourth Amendment didn’t know about GPS tracking.  We can either apply the rules they wrote to new situations, or we can make up our own rules. Whatever the answer to that dilemma, it should apply across the board.  Professor Epps wants to apply the framers’ rule in one situation but make fun of Scalia for doing it another.

Remarkable enough, there are five separate fallacies in this short passage. First, it begs the question. (Of course, if we assume Scalia is correct, I must be wrong to question him.) Next, it distorts what I said in the Jones column.  Third, it repeats the silly libel that anyone who isn’t an orthodox originalist believes only in judges’ discretion. Fourth, it misrepresents my Citizenship Clause scholarship.  Finally, it makes a frankly insupportable claim about originalism—that it must “apply across the board” or be discarded in toto.

Remarkably, the argument as a whole is even more deeply fallacious than the sum of its parts. In both cases, an “originalist” has proposed a rule to replace existing precedent. In both cases, I assert that the new rule is the product of bad originalism and offer support for the existing rule. The inconsistency between my two arguments is thus imaginary.

Ramsey assumes that Scalia’s rule is clearly correct, but that nonetheless I would prefer to “have judges decide for themselves what the best modern approach should be, taking into account modern circumstances and sensibilities (which basically means doing what they think best).” I don’t assume Scalia’s rule is right; in fact, I think it’s wrong. It’s at best a strained inference from 18th Century tort law. It has no clear applicability to the text of the Fourth Amendment, to the history of its adoption, or to the issue of computerized satellite tracking.  Positing it as the “original public meaning” of the Fourth Amendment requires a leap I find unconvincing.

My alternative ground of decision, in addition, is not “have judges decide for themselves what the best modern approach should be.” It is, instead, to apply the Court’s own caselaw: Katz v. United States and its progeny. The “rule we have” is Katz, not Scalia’s fresh interpretation of English tort doctrines. Justice Samuel Alito takes Scalia to task for attempting to replace the Katz standard with his “originalist” “rule” when Katz is more clearly relevant and useful, and I agree.

To expect judges to follow stare decisis is hardly to ask them to “do[] what they think best”; it is to ask them to do their jobs.  To say that supporting stare decisis means believing only in “doing what [judges] think best” is a false dichotomy and, in 2012, a tired one.

Now, as for my alleged false claim of originalist virtue: in my article, “The Citizenship Clause: A ‘Legislative History,’” I suggest that we should apply the text of Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment; I repeat that argument in the online debate with Professor Edward Erler that Ramsey cites.  The amendment’s text has a fairly straightforward natural-language meaning, one which, as far as one can tell, has changed little since its adoption in 1868. This argument from text shares quite a few presuppositions with those of most originalists.  But Ramsey has already claimed that, since I don’t accept Justice Scalia’s strained application of Lord Camden's 1765 opinion in Entick v. Carrington, I simply must believe that nothing in the Constitution’s text governs anything in the present. Constitutional law permits two and only two alternative views.

That’s silly.

A careful reader of my argument will find it more subtle than Ramsey does.  The text of Section One and the caselaw applying it make it settled law that all children born in the United States (other than children of diplomats) are citizens by birth.  In the past 20 years, a new interpretation has arisen. Its proponents claim that the “original intent” of the Fourteenth Amendment was that the children of those present in the U.S. illegally would not be citizens by birth. They cite historical materials to demonstrate that the Framers had that meaning for the term “subject to the jurisdiction” in mind. In the online debate, I write that the proponent of that meaning “has the burden of proving the validity of this special technical interpretation.” My law-review article makes the same point.  My thesis is that those claiming originalist warrant for their interpretation have not proved their case:

[W]e are faced with a claim by [proponents of the restrictive reading] that . . .  an unclear reading was the Framers’ “clear intent.” The question in the first instance is not what the “original intent” was, but rather whether those who make “originalist” claims to have deduced it have borne their burden of proof.

The evidence I cite in the article doesn’t “prove” that the Framers would have thought anything about our current situation; but it falsifies (as close to conclusively as can be done in our inexact field) the claim that the original “intent” was what the proponents claim.  The argument sounds in fidelity to relatively clear text, which is much different from Scalia’s claim of fidelity to general notions of 18th-century law. However, as noted above, my two arguments are the same: where a present rule exists, originalists must carry a burden of proof to displace it; flawed originalist arguments cannot do so.

Finally, Ramsey asserts, “We can either apply the rules they wrote to new situations, or we can make up our own rules. Whatever the answer to that dilemma, it should apply across the board.” I agree that we should “apply the rules they wrote”—that is why I resist allowing the Clause’s text to be replaced by faux originalist interpretation.  I do not believe that Scalia’s “rule” is “the rule[] they wrote” in the Fourth Amendment, however, and so I don’t want to apply it.

Note that Ramsey’s statement assumes that a valid methodology can answer all our constitutional questions, from the proper minimum age of a President to the existence vel non of a right of marital privacy.  That dog, as we say where I grew up, don’t hunt. In law, as in life, we will never find the Philosopher’s Stone.

In arguing and deciding cases, lawyers and judges properly draw on many sources—among them text, history, structure, principle, caselaw, and practicality.  Some of these are dear to originalists—the actual debates by framers and ratifiers, the legal sources upon which they drew, the public discussions that place concepts in contemporaneous contexts, the intellectual and political history to which a given constitutional provision is a response.  I find those materials fascinating and valuable, and as an academic I am proud to associate with originalists of many stripes, including Ramsey.

But originalist scholarship should not require a loyalty oath.  It is absurd to claim that originalist methods are capable of resolving all our questions “across the board.” Unless originalism is magic, it is going to fail in some cases.  United States v. Jones is such a case.

Perhaps some argument from 18th Century law and philosophy would clarify the issue of massive warrantless computerized satellite surveillance.  But if so, Justice Scalia didn’t produce it in Jones. In fact, my article does not actually so much “make fun of Scalia” as report (admittedly with wry pleasure) that his junior colleague, Samuel Alito, openly mocks his opinion. 

There is a difference between good originalism and bad originalism. Scalia’s opinion was bad originalism. Michael Ramsey should be addressing its failures; they are far more significant than mine.

02/10/2012

Originalism on the Web: A Debate on Substantive Due Process
Michael Ramsey

At Cato Unbound, Timothy Sandefur: Why Substantive Due Process Makes Sense.

And a response from Lawrence Rosenthal: Not So Fast, Mr. Sandefur.

Further responses are scheduled from Ryan Williams and Gary Lawson.

(Via David Bernstein at Volokh Conspiracy)

02/09/2012

Originalism and Classic Cases: Marbury v. Madison
Michael Ramsey

This post continues my occasional series on originalist aspects of classic “casebook” cases in Constitutional Law.

Commentators have sometimes suggested that Marbury v. Madison is a problem for originalism because the Constitution’s original meaning doesn’t provide for judicial review.  Thus the idea of using originalism as a method of judicial review is self-contradictory.

I’ve never been impressed with this argument (see Chapter 16 of The Constitution’s Text in Foreign Affairs), in part because the text seems to contemplate federal courts entertaining constitutional cases (Article III, Section 2 and Article VI) and pre-ratification history seems to suggest that the founding generation envisioned some form of judicial review.  But I had forgotten this episode, recounted in Pauline Maier’s outstanding recent book Ratification:

In October 1788, when contemplating possible amendments to mollify anti-federalists, Madison wrote Jefferson about the pros and cons of a bill of rights.  Though doubtful, he suggested two advantages.  In Professor Maier’s words:

Insofar as the political truths they declare became ‘fundamental maxims,’ incorporated into the ‘national sentiment,’ bills of rights might moderate the majority’s tendency to act according to its interests and passions.  A bill of rights could also be used against the government in the unlikely event that it became a source of oppression.  (pp. 444-45).

Jefferson replied the next Spring, arguing in favor of a bill of rights.  After discussing Madison’s points,

[h]e also added another item to Madison’s list of ways in which a written bill of rights might be of use in a republic: ‘the legal check which it puts in the hands of the judiciary.’  An independent judiciary composed of men like George Wythe, John Blair, and Edmund Pendleton could give a bill of rights teeth.  He admitted that declarations of rights might sometimes ‘cramp government in it’s useful exertions,’ but that was ‘shortlived, moderate, and reparable,’ while the disadvantages of having none were ‘permanent, afflicting, and irreparable’ …  (p. 445).

Madison apparently took the point, for when he submitted to Congress the proposal that formed the basis of the first 10 amendments (in June 1789) he argued among other things that:

[i]f provisions protecting rights were incorporated into the Constitution, ‘independent tribunals of justice will consider themselves … the guardians of those rights’ and will become ‘an impenetrable bulwark’ against unlawful assumptions of power by the executive and legislative branches, resisting ‘every encroachment upon rights expressly stipulated in the constitution by the declaration of rights.’  (p. 451).

This seems important evidence of a founding-era understanding that the “judicial Power” included a power of constitutional review -- evidence that may sometimes be missed by people focusing only on the drafting and ratifying of the unamended Constitution.  It’s not just that Jefferson (of all people!) suggested it, and Madison adopted the point.  Even more powerfully, Madison made the point to Congress in pretty strong terms, and so far as Professor Maier recounts, no one objected or questioned the idea.  It’s true that Madison initially didn’t think of the courts as important to a bill of rights, and that in Congress he emphasized other arguments more forcefully.  But it’s still hard to read these passages and conclude that constitutional review by the courts was something John Marshall invented more than a decade later in Marbury.

02/08/2012

The Declining Influence of the U.S. Constitution?
Michael Ramsey

At Prawfsblog, Paul Horwitz: More on the "Declining Influence of the U.S. Constitution."

Horwitz comments on this NYT column by Adam Liptak: ‘We the People’ Loses Appeal with People around the World.  Liptak's column in turn relies on this  article by my former colleague David Law and Mila Versteeg: The Declining Influence of the United States Constitution (forthcoming, N.Y.U. L. Rev. 2012).  Here is the abstract of the Law & Versteeg article from SSRN:

It has been suggested, with growing frequency, that the United States may be losing its influence over constitutionalism in other countries because it is increasingly out of sync with an evolving global consensus on issues of human rights. Little is known in an empirical and systematic way, however, about the extent to which the U.S. Constitution influences the revision and adoption of formal constitutions in other countries.

In this Article, we show empirically that other countries have, in recent decades, become increasingly unlikely to model either the rights-related provisions or the basic structural provisions of their own constitutions upon those found in the U.S. Constitution. Analysis of sixty years of comprehensive data on the content of the world’s constitutions reveals that there is a significant and growing generic component to global constitutionalism, in the form of a set of rights provisions that appear in nearly all formal constitutions. On the basis of this data, we are able to identify the world’s most and least generic constitutions. Our analysis also confirms, however, that the U.S. Constitution is increasingly far from the global mainstream.

The fact that the U.S. Constitution is not widely emulated raises the question of whether there is an alternative paradigm that constitutional drafters in other countries now employ as a model instead. One possibility is that their attention has shifted to some other prominent national constitution. To evaluate this possibility, we analyze the content of the world’s constitutions for telltale patterns of similarity to the constitutions of Canada, Germany, South Africa, and India, which have often been identified as especially influential. We find some support in the data for the notion that the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms has influenced constitution-making in other countries. This influence is neither uniform nor global in scope, however, but instead reflects an evolutionary path shared primarily by other common law countries. By comparison, we uncover no patterns that would suggest widespread constitutional emulation of Germany, South Africa, or India.

Another possibility is that international and regional human rights instruments have become especially influential upon the manner in which national constitutions are written. We find little evidence to indicate that any of the leading human rights treaties now serves as a dominant model for constitutional drafters. Some noteworthy patterns of similarity between national constitutions and international legal instruments do exist: For example, the constitutions of undemocratic countries tend to exhibit greater similarity to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, while those of common law countries manifest the opposite tendency. It is difficult to infer from these patterns, however, that countries have actually emulated international or regional human rights instruments when writing their constitutions.

The topic has various implications for originalism.  Here's one that strikes me.  Though much of the focus is on rights, there is a structural story as well.  The central structural elements of the original Constitution are separation of powers and federalism.  We periodically re-live debates over how aggressively to enforce these original structural provisions.  (The pending struggle over the constitutionality of the health care individual mandate is the current highlight).

My impression is that neither structural aspect of the U.S. Constitution is widely followed worldwide.  Apart from Latin America, most systems are parliamentary rather than presidential.  Strong commitments to federalism are relatively rare as well, although there are notable exceptions.  Consistent with the Law and Versteeg article, my sense is also that newer constitutions are even less likely to adopt these structural features.

The challenge for structural originalism is twofold:  Why are these features, so warmly celebrated by our framers, not widely copied?  And, has the United States' relative success as a nation come because of, or in spite of, these relatively unusual features?  I know there is a fair amount of scholarship on this issue (especially in the political science literature on presidential versus parliamentary systems), but there seems room for more, particularly on the question of federalism.  It should be, at minimum, somewhat relevant in deciding how much energy to invest in defending these structural features of our system.

02/07/2012

Two Reports on USD's Originalism Conference
Mike Rappaport

As I previously noted, USD held its Third Annual Originalism Works in Progress Conference this past weekend.  The Conference, funded by the Hugh and Hazel Darling Foundation, was a big success.  Stanley Fish, writing on the New York Times webpage, says:

Thirty years ago, originalism was dismissed as an outmoded interpretive methodology and stigmatized as a conservative strategy for binding us to the dead hand of the past. Now originalism is on its way to becoming an orthodoxy as more and more scholars once skeptical of the faith declare themselves to be believers. As the number of adherents grows, so do disagreement about just what originalism is and how to apply it. Hence the annual conference.

Fish also notes the academic and collegial atmosphere of the conference.  "Instead [of heated debate on politics], participants argued (vigorously, but politely and with unfailing generosity) about where and with what methods inquiry into the questions should begin."

Ed Whelan, at NRO, also attended the conference:

I’m very pleased to report that the Originalism Works-in-Progress Conference that I took part in this past Friday and Saturday at the University of San Diego amply exceeded my hopeful expectations (so much so that I didn’t wonder why I wasn’t outdoors enjoying San Diego’s beautiful weather).

The conference attracted a diverse array of scholars from some twenty or so law schools (only some of whom are listed at the site linked above): various proponents of different versions of originalism, a number of critics of originalism, and others who may not necessarily have staked out a methodological position on originalism but who are interested in exploring historical evidence of the meaning of constitutional provisions. There were liberals and conservatives (in rather different proportions than in legal academia generally), and there were well-known senior scholars as well as rising young academics.

Thanks to both Stanley and Ed for their generous posts and for their significant contributions at the conference.

The full proceedings of the conference should be online in both video and audio format by the end of February.         

02/06/2012

Originalism on the Web: Federalist Society Symposium on Capitalism, Markets, and the Constitution
Michael Ramsey

The Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy, Volume 35, Number 1 (Winter 2012) is now online, principally featuring the proceedings of the Thirteenth Annual Federalist Society National Student Symposium: Capitalism, Markets and the Constitution.  These symposia always offer a wealth of originalist-oriented analysis from top scholars.  Here is the lineup (pdfs available at the HJLPP website): 

Part I. Economic Freedoms and the Constitution

Randy E. Barnett, Does the Constitution Protect Economic Liberty?

Jeffrey Rosen, Economic Freedoms and the Constitution

 Part II.  Economic Theory, Civic Virtue, and the Meaning of the Constitution

James W. Ely, Jr., The Constitution and Economic Liberty

Renee Lettow Lerner, Enlightenment Economics and the Framing of the U.S. Constitution

Nelson Lund, Judicial Independence, Judicial Virtue, and the Political Economy of the Constitution

G. Edward White, The Political Economy of the Original Constitution

 Part III.  Federalism and Interstate Competition

Jonathan Adler, Interstate Competition and the Race to the Top

Clayton P. Gillette, Fiscal Federalism as a Constraint on the States

John O. McGinnis, Federalism as a Discovery Process and a Catalyst for Humility

Louis Michael Seidman, Depoliticizing Federalism

Part IV.  The Welfare State and American Exceptionalism

 William P. Marshall, National Healthcare and American Constitutional Culture

Jeremy Rabkin, American Exceptionalism and the Healthcare Reform Debate

Neomi Rao, American Dignity and Healthcare Reform

Part V.  Economic Uncertainty and the Role of the Courts 

Paul G. Mahoney, Economic Uncertainty and the Role of the Courts

Todd Zywicki, Economic Uncertainty, The Courts, and the Rule of Law

 

A separate section offers two essays under the heading Reflections on the Law of September 11:  A Ten-Year Retrospective:

Eric A. Posner, Deference to the Executive in the United States after September 11: Congress, the Courts, and the Office of Legal Counsel

Frederick P. Hitz, U.S. Intelligence in the Wake of September 11: The Rise of the Spy Commando and Reorganized Operational Capabilities

The volume also features an essay by Michael McConnell: What Would Hamilton Do? and articles by Timothy Sandefur, In Defense of Substantive Due Process, or the Promise of Lawful Rule, and John M. Kang, In Praise of Hostility: Antiauthoritarianism as Free Speech Principle.

02/05/2012

Thomas H. Lee: Theorizing the Foreign Affairs Constitution
Michael Ramsey

Thomas H. Lee (Fordham University School of Law) has posted Theorizing the Foreign Affairs Constitution (Fordham Law Legal Studies Research Paper ) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:

This article applies international relations theory to derive estimates of the U.S. Constitution's provisions pertaining to foreign relations that Americans would have created in light of the United States' militarily weak condition at the time of founding. It then questions the value of originalism as a technique of constitutional interpretation with respect to the foreign affairs Constitution given the dramatic change in the world power status of the United States.

02/04/2012

Originalism in the Blogs
Michael Ramsey

Alfred Brophy: Cornell on Popular Constitutionalism and the Original Debate Over Originalism.

The article Professor Brophy mentions, by the outstanding legal historian Saul Cornell (Fordham), is worthy of attention for a number of reasons.  I hope to have more to say about it shortly.

02/03/2012

Third Annual Originalism Works-in-Progress Conference in San Diego
Mike Rappaport

This weekend the University of San Diego's Center for the Study of Constitutional Originalism will be holding its third annual Hugh and Hazel Darling Originalism Works-in-Progress Conference.   The Conference is a great event, bringing to San Diego leading scholars from throughout the country to discuss the most recent work on originalism with the Center's six members.  At the last two conferences, I have learned a tremendous amount and am expecting to do so again this year.

This year's conference has a great line up of presenters and commentators:

1.         Ilya Somin (George Mason): "Originalism and Political Ignorance"

Commentator: John McGinnis (Northwestern)

2.         Jamal Greene (Columbia): "Fourteenth Amendment Originalism"

Commentator: Michael Paulsen (St. Thomas)

Special Session on the Enumerated Powers (Papers 3-5)

3.         Kurt Lash (Illinois): "Resolution VI: The Virginia Plan and Authority to Resolve “Collective Action Problems” Under Article I, Sect. 8"

4.         Robert Pushaw (Pepperdine): "Obamacare and the Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause: Identifying Historical Limits on Congress's Powers"

5.         John Mikhail (Georgetown): "The Necessary and Proper Clauses"

Commentator on Papers 3-5: Jack Balkin (Yale)

6.         Jennifer Mason McAward (Notre Dame): "McCulloch and the Thirteenth Amendment"

Commentator: Mark Tushnet (Harvard)

7.         Stephen Sachs (Duke): "Constitutional Backdrops"

Commentator: Andrew Kent (Fordham)

8.         Garrett Epps (Baltimore): "The Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the Fourteenth Amendment: The Case for 'Narrative Originalism"

Commentator: Chris Green (Mississippi)

The last two conferences are on line at the Originalism Center's website.  This year's conference will also be posted on line in a couple of weeks.

For more information on the conference and the Originalism Center, take a look at the Center's website.

John Hoelle: The Virtue of a Natural Law Reading of the U.S. Constitution
Michael Ramsey

John C Hoelle (University of Colorado at Boulder) has posted The Virtue of a Natural Law Reading of the U.S. Constitution (Consortium, 2011) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:

Natural law was arguably fundamental to the U.S. Constitutional project: the Framers apparently assumed courts would interpret and apply unwritten natural law concepts alongside the enacted provisions of the document. However, since the early 19th Century judges have sought to ground all decisions on specific text in the Constitution. Not only is this inconsistent with the intent of the Framers, it makes for bad adjudication. Fortunately, I believe philosophy and custom can be marshaled on the side of re-introducing judicial appeal to natural law. 

Philosophically, the fact that the positivist conception of law has no connection to ethics or natural law principles makes it ontologically bankrupt - unlike natural law, positive law has no ontological validity at its core. Natural law is also inherently primary to positive law - in the sense that moral imperatives shape positive law, and in the sense that interpreting positive law requires higher guiding principles. The existence of a long-standing custom of judicial appeal to natural law provides an ethical basis for judicial creativity in protecting rights that flow from natural law principles. 

As to a model framework, I argue that judges are competent to apply a range of faculties in ascertaining our society’s moral true north. I offer that virtue ethics, and specifically the venerable tradition of the middle path - the doctrine of the mean - can provide a framework which holds promise as a universal principle that can assist us in re-evaluating and re-creating our fundamental law as our social experiment in the United States develops.

02/02/2012

Originalism on the Web (Updated with Professor Arkes' Response)
Michael Ramsey

UPDATE:  Professor Arkes has a long and thoughtful response to my review here.

At the Library of Law and Liberty, I have this book review of Hadley Arkes’ Constitutional Illusions and Anchoring Truths: The Touchstone of the Natural Law.

Professor Arkes is one of the nation's greatest scholars of natural law and the Constitution, and as I say in the review his latest work is an extraordinarily rich re-examination of both famous and obscure constitituional cases, very much worth reading.  But I also express some skepticism about the book's larger project, which is principally to establish a counterpoint to what he calls the conservative positivist view of constitutional law represented by originalists such as Robert Bork and Justice Scalia.  Here is a key passage from the book, highlighted in the review:

[C]onservatives find a more prudent and secure ground to the law by fastening on the positive law of the Constitution.  But that move, offered in the name of prudence, incorporates … the fallacy of presuming that the presence of disagreement, on matters of interpretation, marks the absence of truth.  In the law, as anywhere else, the fact that any idea has been misused, or used wrongly, does not itself prove that the idea itself is untrue.  The array of opinions on “natural right,” the proliferation of new, extravagant claims of rights, cannot itself prove that there is no such thing as “natural right.”  The very notion of a misuse implies its own, apt remedy: For it implies that one can understand, in the first place, the difference between a misuse, or a wrongful use, and a rightful use… The remedy lies then mainly in sharpening our sense of how we have made those discriminations.  But for the conservative lawyer, the prudential backing away from natural law produces … a backing away precisely from that confidence in reason itself as the ground of moral judgment.

My response, in part:

I think Arkes is mistaken, in the passage quoted earlier, if he means to say that conservative positivists like Scalia doubt moral truth.  What Scalia doubts is judges’ superior ability to find and apply moral truth.  ...  The practical question for adjudication is this: are we better off with judges pursuing (as best they can) their idea of natural law, and imposing it on the rest of us?  Or are we better off with judges following (as best they can) the commands of positive law – law that, in a democracy, reflects (to some extent and subject to substantial caveats) the collective moral judgment of the people?  

Arkes does not really grapple with this question because he perceives the central issue to be whether there are moral truths.  But one might think there are, yet also doubt that a small group of elite lawyers, acting in the artificially narrow confines of specific lawsuits, with limited access to and feedback from the wider world, are well situated to find them.  That, I think, is Scalia’s competing position.

02/01/2012

Kevin P. Chapman: Washington Was Right: The Supreme Court Could Have Intervened to Interpret French Treaties
Michael Ramsey

Kevin P. Chapman has posted Washington Was Right: The Supreme Court Could Have Intervened to Interpret French Treaties on SSRN. Here is the abstract:

In the early days of his presidency, George Washington faced his first international crisis when French Ambassador Genet demanded that the United States honor its treaty obligations and provide support to the new French Republic in its ongoing war with Great Britain. Concerned about the legal effect that the French Revolution had on the viability of these obligations, Washington asked the Supreme Court to render an opinion. Chief Justice John Jay replied that the Constitution did not authorize the Supreme Court to render advisory opinions.

If Jay was correct, why did Washington, who presided over the very convention that produced the Constitution, think that the Court had the power? This paper concludes that Washington was at least partially correct. The first section chronicles the many instances where the justices have given extrajudicial advice and service to the other branches. The second section analyzes the text and structure of the Constitution and concludes that it is indeed proper for the Court or its members to render advisory opinions in certain limited circumstances.

01/31/2012

Patrick Henry: The Anti-Madison
Mike Rappaport

From Michael Klarman's review of Pauline Maier's book Ratification: The People Debate the Constitution, 1787-1788 in the Harvard Law Review:

If Madison is the hero of Ratification, then Patrick Henry is the villain. Henry’s early and vociferous opposition to British efforts in the 1760s to assert greater control over the colonies, which put him at risk of a treason prosecution, had made him a revolutionary icon. In 1787–1788, Henry waged war on the Constitution. Widely regarded as the greatest orator of his age (p. 230), Henry dominated the Virginia ratifying convention, holding the floor for as much as one-quarter of the proceedings and keeping his audience in rapt attention (p. 310). Henry disparaged the Constitution for exalting the power of the federal government, threatening the existence of state governments, and posing an existential threat to individual liberty (pp. 260, 264–66). In his desperation to defeat ratification in Virginia, Henry was not above resorting to personal invective and even outright demagoguery — playing on white Virginians’ paranoia regarding slavery (p. 284).

After failing to defeat ratification of the Constitution in Virginia, Henry promised graciously to accept defeat and become a loyal citizen of the republic. He was lying. Instead, Henry led efforts to secure the sort of structural constitutional amendments, such as limits on Congress’s taxing and war-making powers, that Madison and other Federalists believed would eviscerate the new federal government (pp. 307–08). Madison was convinced that Henry’s real aim was to divide the Union and create a separate southern confederacy (p. 126).

Henry used his formidable political power in Virginia to retaliate against Madison, both to avenge Henry’s defeat at the Virginia ratifying convention and to prevent Madison from seizing control of the project of constitutional amendments (pp. 440–41). In the fall of 1788, after the Confederation Congress declared the Constitution duly ratified and set the date for national elections, Henry announced to the Virginia legislature, which he largely controlled, that anyone favoring federal constitutional amendments should oppose Madison’s selection as U.S. senator and warned that Madison’s selection would mean bloodshed in Virginia. The Virginia legislature proceeded to select two Antifederalists, Richard Henry Lee and William Grayson, as U.S. senators, with Madison coming third in the balloting (p. 440). Still not satisfied, Henry persuaded the legislature to implement an unfavorable gerrymander of the House district that included Madison’s home in Orange County and to pass a law imposing a one-year residency requirement on congressional candidates, which would have precluded Madison from seeking election in a more favorably constituted district (pp. 440–41). Henry and other Antifederalists then recruited the formidable James Monroe to run against Madison. After Madison nonetheless won the election, Henry tried to kill the bill of rights that Madison shepherded through Congress, managing to stalemate the Virginia legislature over its ratification for two years.

Whether or not Patrick Henry was a villain, he is a very interesting figure.  Recently, I read through much of the Virginia Ratification debates.  It is true that Henry spoke a great deal.  His speeches struck me as long on rhetoric and short on substance -- a classic windbag.  Yet, the Antifederalists are often hard to understand and certainly Henry had a great reputation at the time, so maybe I am misjudging him.  I would like to read his speeches over again sometime.

According to Thomas Pangle in this excellent Great Courses/Teaching Company course, Henry led one of the three approaches to opposing or seeking changes in the proposed Constitution.  One approach, advocated by Governor George Clinton of NewYork, advocated junking the work of the Philadelphia Convention and starting over again from scratch.   A second approach was championed by Henry, who called for substantial amendments prior to ratification to be drafted in a second convention.   The third approach, which won out, was that of John Hancock, which called for substantial amendments but did not require them prior to ratification.  I hope to have something to say about this issue in the future.  For now, I think there was much to be said for Henry's approach.

Finally, something most people don't know about Henry is that he changed his views over time.  Despite his strong states rights orientation, he later became something of a Federalist in part because of his opposition to the Revolution in France.  While Henry did not appear to support the Sedition Act, he did oppose the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions issued in reaction to them.  I suppose the only consistency here was his opposition to Madison.  When Madison was a nationalist, Henry defended states rights.  When Madison became a Democratic Republican, Henry moved towards the Federalists.

Cross Posted at the Liberty Law Blog.

01/30/2012

OLC's Recess Appointment Opinion
Mike Rappaport

In the past, I have posted here on the narrow original meaning of the Recess Appointments Clause.  See here and here.  I have now analyzed on the Liberty Law Blog OLC's new opinion attempting to justify President's Obama's recent recess appointments based on the idea that the Senate's pro forma sessions were spurious.  While the analysis is not exactly originalism, I hope the connection is close enough to justify referring to it here.  Here is an excerpt:  

To see the problems with the OLC opinion in clearer relief, imagine the following situation.  The Senate is in session, debating measures and passing legislation.  But its rules announce that it will not be conducting any business on advice and consent matters for three weeks – no hearings, no debates, and no votes.  Under the logic of the OLC opinion, why couldn’t the President conclude that he could make a recess appointment during that three week period.  After all, as a practical matter, the Senate is not available to advise and consent on nominations.  Shouldn’t the President be entitled to rely on the Senate’s pronouncements?  That other provisions do not treat this three week period as a recess might be thought irrelevant since those provisions have different purposes.  OLC might seek to distinguish this situation by arguing that the Senate would be in session.  But that begs the question.  The Senate rules said it was in session during the pro forma sessions as well, but OLC ignored those rules for a variety of reasons that also apply to my hypothetical.  Is my hypothetical a reductio ad absurdum or a disturbing prediction of the future if the OLC opinion is accepted – or both?

01/29/2012

Richard Garnett (and others) on Hosanna-Tabor
Michael Ramsey

Richard Garnett writes in response to my post on the Hosanna-Tabor case:

I saw your bit on the Originalism blog about Hosanna-Tabor.  FWIW:  I think [Employment Division v.] Smith was right, AND that [Hosanna-Tabor] is right.  I did an amicus, with Tom Berg and Carl Esbeck, that tried to make something of an originalist argument for the result in [Hosanna-Tabor].  We excerpted it as a short article [available on SSRN here].  

The article is Religious Freedom, Church-State Separation, and the Ministerial Exception(Northwestern University Law Review Colloquy, Vol. 106, p. 175, 2011), by Richard W. Garnett, Thomas Berg, Kimberlee W. Colby, and Carl H. Esbeck.  Here is the abstract:

The Hosanna-Tabor case concerns the separation of church and state, an arrangement that is often misunderstood but is nevertheless a critical dimension of the freedom of religion protected by the First Amendment to our Constitution. For nearly a thousand years, the tradition of Western constitutionalism - the project of protecting political freedom by marking boundaries to the power of government - has been assisted by the principled commitment to religious liberty and to church-state separation, correctly understood. A community that respects - as ours does - both the importance of, and the distinction between, the spheres of political and religious authority is one in which the fundamental rights of all are more secure. A government that acknowledges this distinction, and the limits to its own reach, is one that will more consistently protect and vindicate the liberties of both individuals and institutions.

The “ministerial exception,” at issue in Hosanna-Tabor, is a clear and crucial implication of religious liberty, church autonomy, and the separation of church and state. Because any worthwhile account of religious freedom would respect the authority of religious communities to select freely their own clergy, ministers, teachers, and doctrines, any such account must include something like the ministerial-exception rule. Reasonably constructed and applied, this rule helps civil decision-makers to avoid deciding essentially religious questions. In addition, and more importantly, it protects the fundamental freedom of religious communities to educate and form their members. Although the exception may, in some cases, block lawsuits against religious institutions and communities for discrimination, it rests on the overriding and foundational premise that there are some questions the civil courts do not have the power to answer, some wrongs that a constitutional commitment to church-state separation puts beyond the law’s corrective reach. The civil authority - that is, the authority of a constitutional government - lacks “competence” to intervene in such questions, not so much because they lie beyond its technical or intellectual capacity, but because they lie beyond its jurisdiction.