James Fleming: Are We All Originalists Now? I Hope Not!
Michael Ramsey

James Fleming (Boston University - School of Law) has posted Are We All Originalists Now? I Hope Not! (91 Texas Law Review 1785 (2013)) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:

In recent years, some have asked: “Are we all originalists now?” My response is: “I hope not!” In the Article, I explain why. But first, I show that there is a trick in the question: Even to pose the question “Are we all originalists now?” suggests that one is presupposing what I shall call “the originalist premise.” To answer the question affirmatively certainly shows that one is presupposing it. The originalist premise is the assumption that originalism, rightly conceived, is the best, or indeed the only, conception of fidelity in constitutional interpretation. Put more strongly, it is the assumption that originalism, rightly conceived, has to be the best, or indeed the only, conception of constitutional interpretation. Why so? Because originalism, rightly conceived, just has to be. By definition. In the nature of things — in the nature of the Constitution, in the nature of law, in the nature of interpretation, in the nature of fidelity in constitutional interpretation! I will sketch some of the problematic assumptions underlying this premise (and thus underlying the projects of many scholars who seek to reconstruct originalism or to put forward new originalisms). Worse yet, raising the question “Are we all originalists now?” may presuppose that we all have come around to Justice Antonin Scalia’s and Robert Bork’s ways of thinking, without conceding that many versions of originalism themselves have been moving targets that have moved considerably toward the positions of their critics.

If I hope we are not all originalists now, what do I hope we (at least some of us) are? Much of the best work in constitutional theory today is not originalist in either an old or a new sense; rather, it is what I have called “constructivist.” I am interested in developing a constructivist account of the uses of history in constitutional interpretation. A constructivist world would look somewhat like the pre-originalist world (that is, the pre-Borkian world), although it would be far more sophisticated theoretically than that world was. It would treat original meaning as one source of constitutional meaning among several, not the exclusive source, let alone the exclusive legitimate theory. It would use history for what it teaches rather than for what it purportedly decides for us. In a constructivist world, we would understand that history is a jumble of open possibilities, not authoritative, determinate answers. We would understand that we — self-styled originalists no less than the rest of us — always read the past selectively, from the standpoint of the present, in anticipation of the future. We look to the past, not for authoritative answers, but for illumination about our experience and our commitments. Finally, we would understand that it dishonors the past to pretend — in the name of originalism — that it authoritatively decides questions for us, and to pretend that it avoids the burden of making normative arguments about the meaning of our commitments to abstract moral principles and ends. I argue that fidelity in interpreting the Constitution as written requires a philosophic approach to constitutional interpretation. No approach — including no version of originalism — can responsibly avoid philosophic reflection and choice in interpreting the Constitution.


Josh Blackman: State Judicial Sovereignty
Michael Ramsey

Josh Blackman (South Texas College of Law) has posted State Judicial Sovereignty on SSRN. Here is the abstract:

In our “dual sovereignty,” we have a dual judiciary. While the Constitution creates a single Supreme Court, and gives Congress the power to constitute inferior tribunals, predating our federal union were the courts of the states. Through concurrent jurisdiction, these courts, subject to the complete control of the states, were deemed parallel forums to adjudicate federal claims. Yet, in specific areas, Congress designated the federal courts as the exclusive forums of certain federal claims, depriving the state courts of that jurisdiction. In other areas, the Supreme Court has determined that state courts, with or without the consent of the state, are required to entertain certain federal causes of action.

Each of these well-known features of our judicial system — concurrent, mandatory, and exclusive jurisdiction — represents efforts by one sovereign, the federal government, to command and control the jurisdiction of another sovereign, the states. Though the power to mandate, and exclude state court jurisdiction has been construed broadly, certain limits have been placed on this authority based on a respect for the autonomy of each state to manage their courts. I refer to the basis of these constraints on federal power as state judicial sovereignty. State judicial sovereignty refers to the power of states to vest their courts with subject matter jurisdiction to hear, or not to hear, federal causes of action.

This article articulates a framework to explain how the autonomy of the states to control their own courts interacts with Congress’s efforts to use, or disregard the state courts for federal claims. Building on the analysis of concurrent, mandatory, and exclusive jurisdiction, I identify three attributes of state judicial sovereignty that are repeated throughout the Court’s precedents. First, state judge sovereignty refers to the constitutional obligations and state-law duties, of state judges with respect to federal causes of action. Second, state jurisdictional sovereignty, explains the autonomy of the states to vest their state courts with jurisdiction, subject to the strictures of the federal constitution. Third, state judge sovereignty, working under the auspices of state jurisdictional sovereignty, places a limit on the federal government’s power to regulate the state court, based on the anti-commandeering principle.

The bounds of federal authority over the way state courts conduct their business have remained undefined for over 200 years. This article aims to bring some clarity to those boundaries.


Evan Zoldan: The 'Professional' Meaning of the Ex Post Facto Clauses
Michael Ramsey

Evan Zoldan (University of Toledo College of Law) has posted The 'Professional' Meaning of the Ex Post Facto Clauses on SSRN. Here is the abstract:

Since its decision in Calder v. Bull, the Supreme Court has held consistently that the Ex Post Facto Clauses apply only to retroactive criminal, as opposed to civil, laws. Nevertheless, there continues to be significant scholarly debate over the original meaning of the clauses. Relying on sources contemporaneous with the framing of the Constitution, like treatises, newspaper articles, and notes from the debates in the Philadelphia Convention, some scholars conclude that the original meaning of the Ex Post Facto Clauses includes civil as well as criminal statutes; others, relying largely on this same evidence, conclude that the original meaning reaches only criminal statutes.

The key to resolving the dispute between these two camps of scholars lies in uncovering the “professional” meaning of the Ex Post Facto Clauses, that is, the meaning of the phrase “ex post facto” as it was used by the professional community of American judges and lawyers in the course of their work in the years leading up to the framing of the Constitution. The professional meaning of the phrase ex post facto has always been, and continues to be, the focal point for discussion of the original understanding of the Ex Post Facto Clauses; nevertheless, historical evidence of the professional meaning of the phrase ex post facto has been all but unexamined.

In this article, I seek to resolve the debate over the original understanding of the Ex Post Facto Clauses by examining undeveloped evidence of the professional meaning of the phrase ex post facto. I conclude that the professional meaning of the phrase ex post facto, and original understanding of the Ex Post Facto Clauses, includes retroactive civil, as well as criminal, laws. Finally, even leaving aside these historical arguments, the story of uncovering the professional meaning of the Ex Post Facto Clauses suggests that there are prudential, doctrinal, and structural reasons for reconsidering Calder’s limitation on the scope of the clauses.


Originalism and Positivism: The Problem of Interpretive Contestation
Mike Rappaport

I have written various posts about originalism and positivism.  Perhaps the academic who has written the most about interpretive approaches and positivism is Matt Adler from Duke, but I have relatively neglected his articles.  It is not a mistake I will make again.

I strongly recommend a recent article of his – Interpretive Contestation and Legal Correctness –that lays out the issues clearly and admirably.  In particular, the puzzle for him is how there can be law when there is significant disagreement about interpretive matters (such as the disagreement between originalism and nonoriginalism).  He explores how various theories would address the issue, including natural law theory, positivism, and Dworkin’s interpretive theory.

At the end of the article, his discussion of positivism addresses what in essence is my solution to the problem.  In my view, certain forms of originalism and nonoriginalism are now accepted as law and therefore either can be employed.  The reason is that (1) there are a significant number of people or officials who accept these interpretive methods, (2) decisions reached according to them are disagreed with but not treated as illegal, and therefore (3) the rule of recognition appears to accept both interpretive approaches.

Matt has two objections to this solution.  First, he argues that this solution means that a large number of legal cases involve indeterminacy and therefore neither the majorities in those cases nor the dissenters “were determinately legally correct.”

The question is whether this is a bug or a feature.  I share the concern that such indeterminacy is undesirable as a normative matter, but as a descriptive matter it accurately captures our constitutional practice.  It is generally recognized that hard cases go to the Supreme Court, where the court will split as to the correct resolution.  It is accepted that the Supreme Court gets to decides these cases (so long as it uses acceptable methods).  We may not like it, but that is how our system functions.  If a description of our legal system did not acknowledge this legal indeterminacy, it would be problematic.

Matt’s second objection to the solution that both originalism and nonoriginalism are allowed is that it would suggest that judges and scholars who debate interpretive methods are confused about the law.  They are “confused” because they treat their solution as the legally correct one and other side’s solution as legally incorrect, even though “no method is determinately correct.”

I don’t buy this objection either.  There is nothing problematic in different judges each believing that their view is the better view – the one more likely to be correct.  When they say it is correct, they don’t deny that others believe otherwise.  Nor are they saying that it follows clearly from accepted premises.  Instead, they believe they are correct but recognize that others have a different view (and that different view cannot be ruled out in the same way that deciding cases based on astrology would be).  It is similar to the disagreement about a difficult case involving arguments based on text, structure, history, purpose, tradition and normative desirability.  Just as the justices disagree about the resolution of the case based on these various criteria, so to do the justices disagree about the appropriate interpretive approaches based on multiple criteria.

Finally, it is true that an individual case produces a precedent and therefore some stable resolution, whereas interpretive disagreements continue.  But that is the result of the fact that precedent is not applied to interpretive matters.  The Supreme Court decides case 1 based on originalism and then case 2 based on nonoriginalism.  But no one argues that it failed to follow precedent.  So the problem of interpretive disagreement continues.  But that does not mean that the Court’s disagreement about interpretive approaches is any less legal than its disagreements about particular cases.

James Fleming: Fidelity, Change, and the Good Constitution
Michael Ramsey

James Fleming (Boston University - School of Law) has posted Fidelity, Change, and the Good Constitution (American Journal of Comparative Law, Vol. 62, 2014, Forthcoming) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:

In thinking about fidelity and change in constitutional interpretation, many have framed the basic choice as being between originalism and living constitutionalism. Consider, for example, Jack M. Balkin’s Living Originalism, Robert W. Bennett and Lawrence B. Solum’s Constitutional Originalism: A Debate, and John O. McGinnis and Michael B. Rappaport’s Originalism and the Good Constitution. I shall argue for the superiority of what Ronald Dworkin called “moral readings of the Constitution” and what what Sotirios A. Barber and I have called a “philosophic approach” to constitutional interpretation. By “moral reading” and “philosophic approach,” I refer to conceptions of the Constitution as embodying abstract moral and political principles – not codifying concrete historical rules or practices – and of interpretation of those principles as requiring normative judgments about how they are best understood – not merely historical research to discover relatively specific original meanings.

I shall argue that Dworkin’s and my conceptions of fidelity and change are superior to those of originalism in its many varieties. For our moral readings enable us to see what originalisms (besides Balkin’s) obscure or deny: that one of the main purposes of the Constitution is to exhort us to change in order to honor our aspirational principles and affirmatively to pursue good things like the ends proclaimed in the Preamble. Thus, the aspiration to fidelity requires rather than forbids change. But it does so in the name of honoring our commitments and building out our framework of constitutional self-government with coherence, integrity, and responsibility, rather than in the name of “updating” a “living” constitution. It aims for something better than preventing “rot,” as Scalia famously put it. I shall attempt to make good on these claims by arguing that moral readings help us better understand the Constitution as both a framework for change and a charter of aspirations to which we owe fidelity. They enable us to see how the multiple modalities of argument in constitutional interpretation (including original public meaning and precedent), rather than preventing change, are sites in which we argue about, and sources through which we justify, change: in particular, how best to realize and thus to be faithful to our constitutional aspirations. Or, as Dworkin put it, how to interpret the Constitution so as to make it the best it can be.

In sum, my topic is fidelity without originalism and change without living constitutionalism. I also ponder the reasons for the grip of originalism in our constitutional culture as contrasted with its rejection elsewhere. I shall suggest that the reasons commonly offered in fact demonstrate the grip of the aspiration to fidelity, not the grip of originalism itself. And I shall contend that those reasons in fact show the need for a moral reading or philosophic approach that conceives fidelity as redeeming the promise of our constitutional commitments, not an authoritarian originalist conception of fidelity as following the relatively specific original meaning (or original expected applications) of the Constitution.


Andrew Hyman: The Substantive Role of Congress Under the Equal Protection Clause
Michael Ramsey

Andrew Hyman  (The Institute for Intermediate Study) has posted The Substantive Role of Congress Under the Equal Protection Clause on SSRN.  Here is the abstract: 

The authors of the Fourteenth Amendment deliberately wrote that no state may deny the equal protection “of the laws” rather than “of its laws.” This may seem nowadays like a small difference, but it was important in that era, because it meant that the word “laws” includes both state and federal laws. Hence Congress has a substantive role under this clause that applies against the states. This meaning conflicts with recent U.S. Supreme Court cases like City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) which have largely shut Congress out. The emphasis here is on the original meaning of the Equal Protection Clause, and especially on the public understanding of its text when it was enacted.


Seth Barrett Tillman Comments (Harshly) on Jack Balkin
Michael Ramsey

Seth Barrett Tillman comments on this post

Professor Jack Balkin writes: "The notion that in order for liberals to believe in a living Constitution they have to reject originalism in all of its forms is the biggest canard ever foisted on them." (emphasis added)

 Foisted? That's a very strange passive construction. Exactly who does Balkin think did the "foist[ing]"? 

 If it was the law schools and the academic class, starting at Yale Law School, it was most certainly the liberals themselves. In those circumstances, the term "foist[]" becomes more than odd. It is a direct effort to disclaim any shared responsibility among liberals. If mistakes were made, Balkin should identify -- by name -- which liberals have made and continue to make them. How else should persons interested in a reformed liberal constitutional agenda, one with constitutional fidelity to text and history, identify those operating outside his new and improved interpretive framework? 

On the other hand, Balkin may be suggesting that liberals adopted an anti-originalist discourse because Scalia and 1960s & 1970s movement conservatives put forward a conservatives-are-faithful-to-constitutional-text-and-history-but-liberals-are-not vision. That explanation is pure bilge. Since when do liberals do what Scalia & Company say? Liberals are responsible for what they choose to believe. Liberals are responsible for what they themselves publish. Not Scalia and not movement conservatives -- whose views liberals regularly reject with scorn, contempt, and abuse. Again, this is an obvious effort to deflect blame from those liberals who are responsible for their own anti-originalist world-view, statements, and publications to others who are not. 

 Shameful. Just shameful.

The Meaning of "Natural Born": What if Blackstone Was Wrong?
Michael Ramsey

In thinking about the phrase "natural born Citizen" in the Constitution's eligibility clause, I have assumed (1) that it follows from the English law phrase "natural born subject" and (2) that "natural born subject" at minimum meant anyone born within sovereign territory (apart from children of invaders and diplomats).  The latter point seems clear from Blackstone, who says as much, quite clearly.  (The first point is contested, as some people think the phrase derives not from English law but from the Swiss writer Vattel).

But suppose Blackstone was wrong?  A reader and correspondent I identify (at his request) as TJ (see here and here) has sent me this additional material:

The Law dictionaries have said :

"...that if one born out of the king's allegiance come and dwell in England, his children, begotten here, are not aliens, but denizens."

Nomo-lexikon: A Law-dictionary : Interpreting Such ...
Thomas Blount - 1670
Nomo-lexikon Link

Nomothetēs, the Interpreter: Containing the Genuine ...
John Cowell, ‎Thomas Manley - 1684
Nomothetes Link

A Law Dictionary: or the interpreter of Words and Terms,1708
Law Dictionary link

Cyclopaedia, Or an Universal Dictionary of Arts and ...
Ephraïm Chambers - 1741
Cyclopedia link

A New Law Dictionary Containing the Interpretation and ... - Page iii
Giles Jacob - 1750
New Law Dictionary Link

Lex Mercatoria Rediviva: Or, The Merchant's Directory: ... - Page 276
Wyndham Beawes, ‎Jacques Savary des Brûlons - 1773
Lex Mercatoria Link

The sources appear to check out (the phrasing is similar in each, suggesting a common origin).  And it's clear that a "denizen" in English law was not a natural born subject, but rather an intermediate status between alien and subject.

This possibility raises a puzzle not just for the eligibility clause, but for originalist methodology more generally.  Blackstone was by far the framers' most important source for the content of English law.  But what if Blackstone was wrong?  That is, suppose the framers took a phrase from English law which they knew Blackstone defined in a certain way, but suppose also that Blackstone defined it incorrectly (as a matter of what English law actually was).  What is the original meaning of that phrase in the Constitution?  What Blackstone said it meant (and so what the framers likely thought it meant), or what it "really" meant?

I confess to not having an immediate answer.


Mike Rappaport: The Ascent of Originalism
Michael Ramsey

Co-blogged Mike Rappaport is apparently too modest to put this up, so I'll do it:

At Liberty Law Forum,  The Ascent of Originalism: A Conversation with Michael Rappaport (podcast).  Here is the summary:

The many schools of originalism all face the same questions: does it merely perpetuate the dead hand of the past? What about the exclusion of women and blacks at the Founding? What does one do with the mountains of non-originalist precedent? This next podcast with our own Mike Rappaport, prompted by his new book that he co-authored with co-blogger John McGinnis entitled Originalism and the Good Constitution, focuses on the rise of originalism as an intrepretative methodology for Constitutional Law and attempts to answer these and other questions with a new framework called original methods originalism.

Our discussion thus focuses on the central claim of original methods which is that the enactment of the Constitution and the approval of its subsequent amendments were achieved under supermajority requirements. So we have an enduring Constitution because it has been built to satisfy more than mere majorities. As such, we discuss this important rationale for why its original meaning should be preserved.


George Leef on John Compton's "The Evangelical Origins of the Living Constitution"
Michael Ramsey

In Forbes, George Leef reviews (favorably) The Evangelical Origins of the Living Constitution (Harvard Univ. Press 2014) by John W. Compton (Chapman Political Science).  From the introduction to the review:

The “living Constitution” theory amounts to saying that Supreme Court justices should be allowed to rewrite the foundation of our government as they see fit, sometimes adding ideas that weren’t included, sometimes ignoring ideas that were.

Where did this ruinous idea come from? When and how did it arise? My supposition had always been that it was a creation of the “progressives” in our legal system early in the last century, exemplified by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, and liberal intellectuals who favored FDR’s vast expansion of federal authority.

That view is not exactly right, argues John Compton, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Chapman University, in his new book The Evangelical Origins of the Living Constitution. Compton contends that the “living Constitution” idea arose much earlier in our history, an outgrowth the moral reform movement that swept across the United States from the 1820s until the early decades of the 20th century.

And here is the book description (from Harvard Univ. Press):

The New Deal is often said to represent a sea change in American constitutional history, overturning a century of precedent to permit an expanded federal government, increased regulation of the economy, and eroded property protections. John Compton offers a surprising revision of this familiar narrative, showing that nineteenth-century evangelical Protestants, not New Deal reformers, paved the way for the most important constitutional developments of the twentieth century.

Following the great religious revivals of the early 1800s, American evangelicals embarked on a crusade to eradicate immorality from national life by destroying the property that made it possible. Their cause represented a direct challenge to founding-era legal protections of sinful practices such as slavery, lottery gambling, and buying and selling liquor. Although evangelicals urged the judiciary to bend the rules of constitutional adjudication on behalf of moral reform, antebellum judges usually resisted their overtures. But after the Civil War, American jurists increasingly acquiesced in the destruction of property on moral grounds.

In the early twentieth century, Oliver Wendell Holmes and other critics of laissez-faire constitutionalism used the judiciary’s acceptance of evangelical moral values to demonstrate that conceptions of property rights and federalism were fluid, socially constructed, and subject to modification by democratic majorities. The result was a progressive constitutional regime—rooted in evangelical Protestantism—that would hold sway for the rest of the twentieth century.


Josh Blackman: Congressional Intransigence and Executive Power

Josh Blackman (South Texas College of Law) has posted Congressional Intransigence and Executive Power on SSRN.  Here is the abstract:

In NLRB v. Noel Canning, the Solicitor General argued that the President’s reading of the recess appointment power was justified as a “safety valve” in response to “congressional intransigence.” All nine Justices emphatically rejected this position, finding the President’s three appointments, made during a three-day break, could not be saved because of an obstructionist Senate. Yet, the reliance on “congressional intransigence” as a rationale for broadly interpreting inherent executive powers has been a hallmark of the Obama Presidency. As part of his “We Can’t Wait” platform, President Obama routinely cites Congress’s obstinacy to his agenda as a justification to engage in a series of executive actions that suspend, waive, and even rewrite statutes.

The lesson from Noel Canning is clear—congressional intransigence does not allow the president to flex his inherent Article II powers, as a means to release a safety valve of pressure in Congress. This article places the Court’s unanimous holding in Noel Canning in the context of the President’s unilateral action with respect to the Affordable Care Act, Deferred Action immigration policy, as well as the prisoner trade for Sgt. Bowe Bergdahl, and the “hostilities” in Libya. For each decisive inaction, in the face of with congressional opposition, the President executes at his “lowest ebb,” and warrants the closest scrutiny. In the domestic affairs context, the President can rely only on his inherent “policy powers,” which reside below Justice Jackson’s third Youngstown tier, in the fourth zone of “insight.”

(Via Josh Blackman's Blog).


Mark Graber: Preliminary Thoughts on Identifying and Mending a Dysfunctional Constitutional Order
Michael Ramsey

Mark Graber (University of Maryland - Francis King Carey School of Law) has posted Belling the Partisan Cats: Preliminary Thoughts on Identifying and Mending a Dysfunctional Constitutional Order (Boston University Law Review, Vol. 94, 2014, p. 611) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:

This paper sharpens debates over whether the Constitution of the United States and the American constitutional order are presently dysfunctional, the nature of any dysfunctions, and how underlying regime flaws are likely to be corrected. Rather than focusing primarily on constitutional text, this Article explores the dynamic ways in which constitutional processes have influenced and been influenced by the structure of constitutional politics. Constitutional dysfunction is best conceptualized as the failure of a constitutional order rather than as a consequence of a flawed constitutional text, and dysfunction typically occurs when a regime is unable to transition from a dysfunctional constitutional order to better constitutional politics. The New Deal constitutional order experienced a fairly painless transition and was able to operate successfully under the formal rules established in 1789 largely because institutions conformed to a system of two non-ideological parties. The increased polarization of the two major parties leads to failures to operate the New Deal constitutional order and inhibits a transition to a better constitution order. Those who champion constitutional reform must accept their incapacity to bell the partisan cats. Most likely, the present constitutional dysfunction will end only with the triumph of one major party. A slight chance exists that Americans will find a way to strengthen more centrist tendencies in the present constitutional order. That success, however, will more likely require cooperation from partisan elites than a successful escape from the conditions of contemporary politics.


More from Philip Hamburger on "Is Administrative Law Unlawful"
Michael Ramsey

Philip Hamburger, guest-blogging at Volokh Conspiracy, has these posts describing his recent book:

Why the history of administrative power matters

The foundation of my new book, Is Administrative Law Unlawful?, is a new account of the history of administrative law. Administrative power has been a part of American life for more than a century, but much of its history has remained untold. And this matters, because the history is sobering, and once it is understood, the danger and unlawfulness of administrative power become painfully apparent. ...

Extralegal power, delegation, and necessity

Conventionally, the constitutional analysis of administrative power focuses simply on whether this sort of power collides with particular provisions of the Constitution. It is useful, however, before turning to detailed constitutional questions, to consider the way in which this power is extralegal. With this concept, one can begin recognize the dangerous nature of administrative power and thus can begin to understand the importance of the constitutional objections. ...

The Constitution’s repudiation of extralegal power

The Constitution systematically repudiated absolute power, including extralegal power. Too often, administrative law is considered in terms of relatively flat constitutional doctrines, without much thought about its history, the dangers that provoked the development of constitutional law or broader conceptions of the role of law. Once one realizes that absolute power — to be precise, extralegal power — was the central danger that provoked the development of constitutional law, it becomes clear that such power is forbidden by the U.S. Constitution. Such is the main legal argument of my new book, Is Administrative Law Unlawful? ...

Rule of law vs. rule through law

At the level of political theory, my book, Is Administrative Law Unlawful?, questions the usefulness of the notion of rule of law. This amorphous principle has been used by some commentators, such as Richard Epstein, to critique administrative power, but more typically it has lent itself to justifications of this sort of power. And this should be no surprise, for much administrative power has statutory authorization, and it therefore is not obvious that it violates the rule of law.

What more clearly is at stake in administrative and other extralegal power is the principle of rule through law (or, if you prefer, rule by law). As explained by my book, absolute power in the 17th century was an attempt to rule outside the law, and, in response, constitutional law (both in England and America) was framed as a means of imposing rule through law, including rule through the regular courts. Precisely to preclude rule by prerogative or administrative edict, constitutional law placed lawmaking power in a legislative body and judicial power in courts, thereby allowing only rule by law. ...

Also, at Liberty Law Forum, The Unlawful Administrative State: A Conversation with Philip Hamburger (podcast).


Jeffrey Sawyer: English Law and American Democracy in the Revolutionary Republic
Michael Ramsey

Jeffrey K. Sawyer (University of Baltimore School of Law) has posted English Law and American Democracy in the Revolutionary Republic: Maryland, 1776-1822 (Maryland Historical Magazine, Vol. 108, No. 3 (Fall 2013), pp. 261‑290) on SSRN.  Here is the abstract:

Between 1776 and 1784, eleven of the original thirteen states made some provision for the continuing authority of the common law and British statutes. But there were highly significant variations in the pattern from state to state, variations that helped to differentiate each state as a unique jurisdiction. In Maryland, despite the effort of leading lawyers to settle the matter once and for all in 1776, the precise effects of Article 3 had to be worked out over several decades of political, legal, and intellectual maneuvering. As a result, Marylanders left a remarkable record of politicians, lawyers, and judges contesting for different views of the importance of legal continuity in a democratic republic. This history helps explain why Marylanders are still entitled to the benefits of the common law by the authority of Article 5 of their current constitution, and it also illuminates a defining feature of American democracy, the tension between its theory of sovereignty and the rule of law in practice.

As historians and students of the revolutionary era in Maryland well know, the constitution of 1776 as a whole was a defeat for direct democracy and any popular agenda of social leveling or economic equality that may have been in play, A few idealists, notably Colonel Rezin Hammond of Anne Arundel County, were elected to the 1776 convention but were unable to build a strong statewide political coalition. Effectively led by their wealthy and worldly leaders, notably Charles Carroll of Carrollton, Matthew Tilghman, Samuel Chase, Thomas Johnson, Charles Carroll the Barrister, and William Paca, a majority of delegates embraced independence from the British Empire but voted consistently for a style of government that was familiar and predictable. Why was this plan so conservative? In part because delegates embraced a conception of democratic legitimacy shaped not just by Revolutionary ideals and rhetoric about liberty and rights, but also by the particulars of local legal history.

(Via Larry Solum at Legal Theory Blog).


Scott Stephenson: Federalism and Rights Deliberation
Michael Ramsey

Scott Stephenson (JSD candidate, Yale Law School) has posted Federalism and Rights Deliberation (Melbourne University Law Review, Forthcoming) on SSRN.  Here is the abstract:

The relationship between federalism and rights is an understudied aspect of Australia’s constitutional system. It is rarely analysed in detail because the premise of most theories, which are drawn from the United States, is that federalism alters substantive outcomes on rights. These theories do not connect to Australia’s constitutional experience because the country’s federal system produces a large degree of policy uniformity.

In this paper, I argue that Australia’s federal system has a substantial impact on legislative deliberations of rights issues. Even when policy uniformity results, federalism introduces additional actors and alternative viewpoints into the lawmaking process, altering patterns of discourse. I employ three case studies — counter-terrorism, same-sex marriage and organised crime — to highlight and analyse the connections between federalism and rights deliberation. This understanding of the relationship has implications for the place of federalism in Australia’s constitutional system, which is often undervalued, and the country’s approach to rights protection, which relies extensively on a deliberative process that is attune to rights issues.


Seth Barrett Tillman on Quorums
Michael Ramsey

Seth Barrett Tillman (National University of Ireland, Maynooth - Faculty of Law) has posted two short essays on quorums on SSRN.  The first is Letter from Seth Barrett Tillman to Professor Anonymous, The Quorum Clause.  Here is the abstract:

Dear Professor,

You asked do “you believe that it is constitutional for a house to operate with a minority of members so long as no one asks for a quorum call[?]” In fact, I do.

This is why.

And as a follow-up:  Letter from Seth Barrett Tillman to Jimmy Y T MA, Counsel to the Legislature, Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China, Counting Quorums.  Here is the abstract:

Dear Legislative Counsel,

Thank you for writing. I am happy to send you a copy of my publication on the Quorum Clause of the U.S. Constitution. I have attached a copy. [See entry above.  --Ed.] It is short (and, perhaps, a bit informal), but I hope useful to scholars and practitioners such as yourself. 

You ask an interesting question—Do members have an unlimited right to seek quorum calls, even if repetitive, even if they effectively amount to a filibuster? I have not written on that precise question, but I have thought about that question for some years and corresponded with a wide array of parliamentarians in the English-speaking world following lex parliamentaria. I offer some thoughts below. Everything I suggest below assumes that any meeting was duly noticed under the relevant organic law: the constitution, statutes, standing parliamentary orders and rules, etc.


Is Griswold v. Connecticut Consistent with the Original Meaning?
Mike Rappaport

Griswold – which held that married couples had a constitutional right to use contraceptives – is an extremely popular case.  Supreme Court nominees usually feel the need to approve of the decision in their confirmation hearings (just as they feel the need to say approving things about originalism or at least not to disagree with it).  In our book, Originalism and the Good Constitution, John McGinnis and I argue that, even if Griswold is not in accord with the original meaning, a proper theory of precedent would enforce it as having widespread support across the political spectrum.     

But is Griswold in accord with the original meaning?  I don’t believe any of the justifications offered in Griswold – substantive due process, the 9th Amendment, emanations from penumbras – work from an originalist perspective.  But I do believe that another basis may do the trick. 

These days I am inclined towards the following view of the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the 14th Amendment (which several other scholars hold in various forms).  Under this view – which might be termed the prevalent rights view – “the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States” – refers to the rights that are prevalent throughout the United States at a particular time.  Thus, to determine what those rights are, one must look at what rights the states (and perhaps the federal government) protect.  It may be that those rights should have been protected over a period of time, not just for a particular instant.  I will try to explain the basis for this view in a future post. 

Under this view, there appears to be a strong argument that the right of married couples to use contraceptives was a prevalent right in 1965 – that is, a right enjoyed throughout the United States.  According to Justice Harlan in Poe v. Ullman, “Although the Federal Government and many States have at one time or other had on their books statutes forbidding or regulating the distribution of contraceptives, none, so far as I can find, has made the use of contraceptives a crime.”   

If Justice Harlan is right, then this would support a right to use contraceptives.  Exactly the parameters of that right – whether it extended to unmarried couples, to the distribution of contraceptives, and other aspects – would depend on the number of states that treated these aspects as rights and the necessary number needed to establish it as a prevalent right.  

I should note that I have changed my mind about this issue.  Based on the feeble justifications given for the right in Griswold and subsequent cases, I have for a long time believed that Griswold did not accord with the original meaning.  But now I am inclined (although am not certain) that it is justified under the original meaning. 

(Cross posted at the Liberty Law Blog)

Paul Kahn & Kiel Robert Brennan-Marquez: Statutes and Democratic Self-Authorship
Michael Ramsey

Paul Kahn (Yale Law School) and Kiel Robert Brennan-Marquez (Yale Law School) have posted Statutes and Democratic Self-Authorship (William & Mary Law Review, Forthcoming) on SSRN. Here is the abstract: 

This Article reframes the longstanding debate over statutory interpretation. That debate tracks a familiar dichotomy: text v. purpose. Both sides of the debate, however, accept the idea that courts are to be the faithful agents of the legislature that authors the laws. We disagree. In our view, in a democracy the people must see themselves as the authors of statutes. This is what allows the rule of law and the “rule of men” — that is, the rule of the people — to coincide. The faithful agency view of statutory construction has confused drafting with authorship: the legislature drafts statutes, but authorship is a social practice of the people holding themselves accountable for the law. The courts’ role, when interpreting a statute, is to cast the law as something that we the people have done together, rather than something done to us by legislators.

This shift in paradigm yields dramatic consequences. Apart from helping to overcome the endless debate between textualism and purposivism, our theory also brings considerable clarity to what courts actually do when they interpret statutes. Moreover, it locates the judicial function squarely within an important strand of the political theory of self-government, stretching from Thomas Hobbes to Jurgen Habermas.

For many decades, commentators have been sympathetic to the idea of self-authorship as applied to “fundamental” law — especially constitutional law. But they have been unable to connect that theory of self-authorship to the construction of “ordinary” laws. The error has two basic sources. First, scholars have focused too much on judicial review as a counter-majoritarian practice; second, they have fixated on voting as the site of democratic participation. Our argument rejects both of these limits, offering a robust account of democracy as the rule of law.


Jack Balkin: How Liberals Can Reclaim the Constitution
Michael Ramsey

In the Washington Post, Jack Balkin: How Liberals Can Reclaim the Constitution.  From the conclusion:

The notion that in order for liberals to believe in a living Constitution they have to reject originalism in all of its forms is the biggest canard ever foisted on them. Liberals should claim for themselves — as conservatives already have — not only the constitutional text but the entire constitutional tradition, including the ideals and hopes of the generations that fought to create a new nation and establish the Constitution.

The founders — including the Reconstruction framers who gave us the 13th, 14th and 15th amendments — created a framework on which later generations must build to realize the Constitution’s great promises of liberty and equality. It is our job, in our own day, to further that great work. That is the liberal vision of the Constitution, and it is both originalist and living constitutionalist.

Via Balkinization, where Professor Balkin adds:

The point of the piece is not that liberals should all become Scalia-style originalists and start talking like movement conservatives do. Rather, it's that liberals should simply reject the false dichotomy between originalism and a living Constitution.

Accepting that opposition as  the proper frame for debate just locks liberals into a clever rhetorical strategy created by movement conservatives in the 1980s, who wanted to put themselves on the side of the American constitutional tradition, and liberals on the outside looking in.  Contemporary liberals should reject that invitation. The American constitutional tradition, understood in its best light, is a liberal egalitarian tradition.

I'm all for using originalism to reach liberal results -- I think that's the best way to defend originalism from the charge that it's no more than cover for a conservative agenda.  But Balkin seems to go to the opposite extreme, and find that (his version of) originalism always (or almost always) leads to liberal results.  Why is it not most plausible that the Constitution is a set of rules, drafted without knowledge of modern political squabbles, that sometimes leads to conservative results (in modern terms) and sometimes to liberal results?  Sadly, there is not much constituency for that proposition.



Ilan Wurman on "Is Administrative Law Unlawful"?
Michael Ramsey

In The Weekly Standard, Ilan Wurman (see his interesting prior article here) reviews (favorably) Philip Hamburger's Is Administrative Law Unlawful? From the review's introduction:

The administrative state is a modern invention. It was, and remains, a necessity in our complex modern age. Or so goes the argument.

“The trouble in early times was almost altogether about the constitution of government; and consequently that was what engrossed men’s thoughts,” wrote Woodrow Wilson in his Study of Administration (1887). “The functions of government were simple, because life itself was simple. .  .  . No one who possessed power was long at a loss how to use it.” That all changed—apparently in Wilson’s generation—when “present complexities of trade and perplexities of commercial speculation” posed new challenges for government. 

“In brief,” Wilson wrote, “if difficulties of governmental action are to be seen gathering in other centuries, they are to be seen culminating in our own.” So we need experts: “[W]e have reached a time when administrative study and creation are imperatively necessary to the well-being of our governments saddled with the habits of a long period of constitution-making.” 

Necessary; there is no alternative. As the Supreme Court has dclared, “[I]n our increasingly complex society, replete with ever changing and more technical problems, Congress simply cannot do its job absent an ability to delegate power under broad general directives.” 

That is a convenient narrative for the defenders of the administrative state. But it is fanciful. It is not historically accurate. And the justifications—especially the claim of necessity—are not new. Neither are the powers of the administrative state. Indeed, Philip Hamburger, professor of law at Columbia, argues here that it was precisely these justifications and powers that English and American constitutional law developed to protect us against. Not only is the modern administrative state unconstitutional, it is the very thing our Constitution sought to prevent.

(Via Power Line)

RELATED:  Professor Hamburger will be blogging about his book at Volokh Conspiracy this week. 


Roy Brownell: The Independence of the Vice President
Michael Ramsey

In the current issue of the NYU Journal of Legislation and Public Policy, Roy E. Brownell II has the article The Independence of the Vice Presidency (17 N.Y.U. J. L. & Pub. Pol'y 297 (2014)).  From the introduction:

Public portrayal of the Vice President’s standing in relation to the President suffers from a trio of shortcomings. One is that the Vice President is often characterized, either explicitly or implicitly, as lacking independence from the President. The Vice President is widely viewed as ready and willing to do all that the President asks, whenever he asks it; the prototypical “company man.” As  a result, it is often assumed the Vice President must do his bidding. However, such assertions confuse political prudence with constitutional prescription. This article will emphasize that, as a constitutional matter, the Vice President is independent from the President and can and does take actions and public positions that are contrary to the latter’s wishes.

A second problem in discussions of presidential-vice presidential relations is that, while some authorities properly note the Vice President’s independence, they fail to analyze this trait in any detail. It has been largely left as an unexamined assumption. This article will attempt to fill this void and review closely the legal sources of, and justifications behind, vice presidential independence.

Finally, many of the same authorities who recognize the Vice President as constitutionally independent believe this characteristic is little more than a theoretical proposition. They contend that vice presidential autonomy as a practical matter is, or at least has recently become, a dead letter. These scholars end up in the same place as those who question or reject entirely the office’s independence. Thus, there is a rough consensus that the Vice President lacks autonomy, be it either constitutional or practical. This article cuts against the grain and argues that the Vice President is independent in both respects.

(Thanks to Seth Barrett Tillman for the pointer).


Mark Kende: Justice Clarence Thomas's Korematsu Problem
Michael Ramsey

Mark Kende (Drake University Law School) has posted Justice Clarence Thomas's Korematsu Problem (Harvard Journal of Racial & Ethnic Justice, Vol. 30, p. 201, 2014) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:  

The U.S. Supreme Court's infamous decision in Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) has been in the news recently as some scholars and advocates, such as Peter Irons, have asked the Court to formally repudiate the decision. This essay breaks new ground by demonstrating that Justice Clarence Thomas’s jurisprudence on executive power is consistent with that case. Two cases provide the major evidence. First, Justice Thomas was the lone dissenter in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) where he reasoned that enemy combatants who were U.S. citizens have virtually no due process rights.

Moreover, in Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499 (2005), he dissented and supported the California prison system’s practice of racially segregating inmates during the intake process. California argued this minimized racial violence. Thomas therefore abandoned his well-known position of racial color-blindness in the case. The juxtaposition of these opinions shows that he would have placed weak national security concerns ahead of strong evidence of racial bias as in Korematsu. The essay also addresses several counter-arguments. While Justice Thomas is a well-known supporter of very strong Presidential power, this essay demonstrates that his position is more extreme than might have been thought.


Neomi Rao on the President's Removal Power
Michael Ramsey

Neomi Rao (George Mason University School of Law) has posted Removal: Necessary and Sufficient for Presidential Control (Alabama Law Review, Vol. 65, No. 5, pp. 1205-1276, 2014) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:

Legal and political uncertainty continues to surround the independent agencies. Courts and scholars have recognized that control over administration usually depends on political realities rather than on legal categories of "independence." This perspective, however, tends to disregard the constitutional boundaries for administration. Contrary to the conventional view, I explain why Congress's authority over agency structure must have judicially enforceable limits in order to prevent encroachment on the executive power. In light of the constitutional text and structure, this Article demonstrates that the ability to remove principal officers is necessary and sufficient for presidential control of the executive branch. This means that all agencies, including the so-called independent agencies, must answer to the President. The principle allows Congress and the President to operate within their respective spheres while leaving most questions about actual administrative control to the political process. Limits on the President's removal authority have always been in tension with the basic constitutional design and in recent years there has been growing dissatisfaction with the meaning, structure, and effects of independence. The precedents and functional justifications for supporting agency independence have largely collapsed. The issue is ripe for reconsideration. The constitutional structure requires presidential control and supervision over administration and the removal power provides the mechanism for the possibility of such control.


Adam Winkler on Noel Canning as a Victory for Nonoriginalism
Michael Ramsey

At Slate, Adam Winkler celebrates:  Active Liberty Lives! Justice Breyer’s opinion in the recess appointments case deals a blow to originalism.

Cass Sunstein has a similarly celebratory article at Bloomberg View: Breyer's Greatest Triumph over Scalia.

My reaction:

No one celebrates wins over weak, marginal opponents.  In celebrating a (supposed) defeat of originalism, Winkler and Sunstein are acknowledging the threat it poses to their way of thinking.  A generation ago, no one would have thought it noteworthy that the Supreme Court adopted a nonoriginalist approach.


Is Originalism the Law?: The Constitution in Exile Problem
Mike Rappaport

Note: Yesterday, I put up a post on Steve Sachs's new paper addressing the issue whether originalism is the law.  In it I reference, an earlier post I did on his paper.  By mistake, that earlier post had been put up only on the Liberty Law Blog, not on the Originalism Blog.  Sorry about.  So here is the earlier post. This should be read before reading yesterday's post Is Originalism the Law: The Basis of Nonoriginalism.  

In the past, I have discussed the justification for originalism that the original meaning of the Constitution is the law. Under this positivist view, originalism is the law and and therefore one can make a normative argument that the original meaning should be followed. I have expressed skepticism about this argument: my tentative position is that the law allows, within significant limits, both originalism and nonoriginalism.

Steve Sachs has a new paper out that attempts to develop the positivist originalist argument further. In The “Constitution in Exile” as a Problem for Legal Theory, Steve in part responds to my post questioning this positivist argument:

On its face, the jurisprudential objection is quite plausible. It has even persuaded some originalists. Michael Rappaport, for example, straightforwardly defends originalism as a “desirable” reform program, rather than as a consequence of “following the law.” He notes that “people are in jail in the U.S.—lots of them—for violating laws that are inconsistent with the Constitution’s original meaning,” and that “nonoriginalist Supreme Court decisions are enforced without a second thought by most people all the time.” In this context, “[w]hat does it mean to say that the Constitution’s original meaning is the law?” More generally, “[w]hat does it mean for something to be the law, if the legal system is not enforcing it?”

Steve’s paper is excellent and I strongly recommend it. The paper contains all types of interesting insights from which I learned quite a bit. But in the end the paper does not really move me any closer to the view that the original meaning is the law under positivism.

(As an aside, I should note that my position is not, as Steve suggests, merely that originalism should be justified as a desirable reform. For a discussion, see here.)

In much of the paper, Steve is concerned merely to rebut the argument that simply because judges are regularly enforcing nonoriginalist rules means that the law is nonoriginalist. He argues that one can have nonoriginalist rules enforced even though originalism is the law. To illustrate his point, he imagines a hypothetical society where there is a law that says the people may not eat creatures that feel pain. The people in this society believe that lobsters did not feel pain and consequently eat lobsters regularly. As a descriptive matter, one might conclude that eating lobsters was lawful in this society. But suppose it turned out that lobsters do feel pain. In that event, Steve argues, one might conclude that even though the people in the society believe that eating lobsters is lawful, they are mistaken.

This is a powerful example and may very well show that widespread actions that are accepted by a legal system could be unlawful in some wider sense even though they are accepted as lawful. Steve attempts to justify this example based on a more general approach. He argues that under the legal reasoning accepted in the United States, when there is a conflict between higher and lower norms, the higher norm takes precedence. In the prior example, the higher norm is “do not eat creatures that feel pain; the lower norm is “lobsters may be eaten (because they do not feel pain).”

I have a lot of sympathy for this argument (although I am not certain it is correct). But I have two reservations. First, I think it oversimplifies matters to say that the law in that society prohibited the eating of lobsters. The legal system actually allowed the eating of lobsters. The law that led to that result involved a mistake and had the mistake been revealed a different result would have occurred. So in a way the law allowed the eating of lobster and in another way it prohibited it.

Second, but more importantly, Steve imagines that something like this argument would apply to justify originalism. The higher norm would be “follow the original meaning of the Constitution”; the lower norm is “provision X has a meaning” (where X turns out not to be the original meaning). But I believe that the case of originalism is different than the lobster case (as Steve himself recognizes).

In a future post, I plan to discuss the issue further. 

Heidi Kitrosser: Interpretive Modesty
Michael Ramsey

Heidi Kitrosser (University of Minnesota - Twin Cities - School of Law) has posted Interpretive Modesty (Minnesota Legal Studies Research Paper No. 14-34) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:

“New originalism” presents a profound challenge to originalist determinacy – that is, to the notion that original constitutional meanings alone can resolve most constitutional controversies. While new originalists purport to seek out and adhere to original meanings of constitutional provisions, they acknowledge that some original meanings are too thin to fully resolve many constitutional questions. Such acknowledgment stands in sharp tension with traditional claims of originalist determinacy.

While new originalism improves on “old originalism” in important ways, the former’s break from determinacy is not clean enough. New originalists are correct that it is neither epistemologically defensible nor normatively preferable to attribute complete answers to constitutional controversies to original textual meanings alone. This Article bolsters that point, responding to old originalists’ newest defenses of determinacy. Yet the Article criticizes new originalists for their own, more limited determinacy. While new originalists maintain that original meanings alone often are insufficient to resolve constitutional controversies, they overlook the epistemic uncertainties intrinsic in ascertaining original meanings themselves.

This Article offers an “all the way down” critique of originalist determinacy. It challenges originalism’s ability not only to answer all constitutional questions, but also to settle reliably on single original meanings in the first place. The Article proposes to build on two of new originalism’s tools – its embrace of thin original meanings and its distinction between interpretation and construction – and to build as well on historicist critiques of originalism to create a new approach to epistemic uncertainty in constitutional interpretation. The approach is called “interpretive modesty.”


Is Originalism the Law?: The Basis of Nonoriginalism
Mike Rappaport

In my last post on Steve Sachs’s new paper, I noted that Steve argues that one can have nonoriginalist rules enforced even though originalism is the law. I wrote:

To illustrate his point, he imagines a hypothetical society where there is a law that says the people may not eat creatures that feel pain. The people in this society believe that lobsters did not feel pain and consequently eat lobsters regularly. As a descriptive matter, one might conclude that eating lobsters was lawful in this society. But suppose it turned out that lobsters do feel pain. In that event, Steve argues, one might conclude that even though the people in the society believe that eating lobsters is lawful, they are mistaken.

This is an important example, but it is not clear that it can be used to argue for originalism. The question is how similar this example is to the current situation involving nonoriginalist judging. Let’s analyze a couple of different situations.

1. A Mistake: In Sachs’s example, the judges make a mistake. As a result, pretty much everyone – those who believe in the principle of not eating creatures that feel pain and those who believe that lobsters do not feel pain – would acknowledge, once the mistake is corrected, that the lobsters should not be eaten.

If judges were making a mistake about their interpretations – if nonoriginalist judges thought their decisions were actually the original meaning but were mistaken about that – then this situation would be comparable to the lobster example. But, as I argue below, most nonoriginalist judges do not mistakenly believe that they are following originalism.

2. Open Contestation: Now consider the opposite extreme. Nonoriginalists come right out and acknowledge that they are not applying the original meaning. In this situation, it is clear that the rule of recognition does not require originalism. Instead, it allows both originalism and nonoriginalism since decisions are written openly from both perspectives.

3. Silence as to the Original Meaning: Not let’s move to the situation which may reflect the reality of American law. In this situation, most judges do not accept originalism, but they do not acknowledge that in public or in their opinions. This is neither exactly like the mistake (or lobster situation) in scenario 1 nor like the open contestation of scenario 2.

What is one to say about this situation? One take is that this is much more like the open contestation than the mistake scenario. The reason is that it all judges and most lawyers know that large numbers of judges do not believe in originalism. Thus, it is common knowledge that originalism is not accepted generally among judges and this suggests that originalism is not required by the rule of recognition.

Of course, one might disagree with this argument. The rule of recognition is what everyone agrees with – or at least what is not criticized as unlawful by the relevant officials. But decisions that claim not to follow the original meaning arguably do not fall within this category. One cannot say that people agree with such decisions, since there aren’t any, and we do not know that such decisions would not be criticized as unlawful.

While this argument has some merit, it does not establish that nonoriginalism is not the law. It merely establishes that decisions that openly claim not to follow the original meaning are not the law. It does not establish that decisions that simply (or silently) do not follow the original meaning are not the law.

Now one might respond that there is a norm against such silent actions, but that is hard to claim, because that is what has been going on for a long time. But even if that were the case, this would not stop nonoriginalism. First, nonoriginalist judges are probably not unwilling to say that they follow precedent despite a contrary original meaning. Second, even in cases where there are no precedents, nonoriginalist judges often have moves that allow them to ignore the original meaning. For example, the recent Recess Appointments decision in Noel Canning – where there were no Supreme Court precedents – illustrated two of these. Justice Breyer claimed that the original meaning was ambiguous by relying on a very capacious understanding of ambiguity. (More generally, nonoriginalist judges could often claim that the original meaning is not clear by adopting a strict standard for establishing the original meaning.) He also claimed that practice was important in determining the meaning of the Constitution.

Thus, there are significant techniques that nonoriginalists can use to decide cases according to nonoriginalism without expressly claiming that they are not following the original meaning.

(Cross posted at the Liberty Law Blog)

Richard Garnett: Accommodation, Establishment, and Freedom of Religion
Michael Ramsey

Richard Garnett (Notre Dame Law School) has posted Accommodation, Establishment, and Freedom of Religion (67 Vand. L. Rev. En Banc 39 (2014)) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:

This short essay engages the argument that it would violate the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause to exempt an ordinary, nonreligious, profit-seeking business – such as Hobby Lobby – from the Affordable Care Act’s contraceptive-coverage rules. In response to this argument, it is emphasized that the First Amendment not only permits but invites generous, religion-specific accommodations and exemptions and that the Court’s Smith decision does not teach otherwise. In addition, this essay proposes that laws and policies that promote and protect religious freedom should be seen as having a “secular purpose” and that because religious freedom, like clean air, is an aspect of the public good, it is both appropriate and unremarkable that, sometimes, maintaining the conditions for religious freedom is not cost-free.

RELATED:  Sasha Volokh expresses an opposite intuition here, quoting Justice Stevens' concurrence in City of Boerne v. Flores.  But he adds:

Note that there may be strong originalist arguments that religious exemptions were permissible at the Founding, so I’m not trying to make any strong originalist point here — just that, as a first-principles matter, I’m not wild about the idea of religious exemptions, and find them to be in strong tension with my Establishment Clause sympathies.

That comment captures the originalist/nonoriginalist debate nicely, if perhaps unintentionally.  It's a fair question whether religious exemptions constitute laws "respecting an establishment of religion."  So you could decide it by trying the figure out what "establishment of religion" meant to the founding generation.  Or you could decide it based on your "Establishment Clause sympathies," whatever they may be.

And, to echo what I've said before, I'm not necessarily trying to stack the argument for or against originalism in putting the choice in such terms.  I'm sure if I were a judge, or if I thought judges would usually agree with my sympathies, I would be very tempted to pick the latter.  And there are decent public policy arguments for the latter view in any event.  But it is important to see the choice for what it is.


The Recess Appointments Decision Part IV: The Motivations Underlying Justice Breyer’s Practice Based Decision

The day after the Noel Canning case involving the Recess Appointments Clause came down, the Federalist Society held a teleforum conference on the issue. I was on a panel with Noel Canning’s attorney in the Supreme Court, Noel Francisco, as well as Professor Kristin Hickman from Minnesota Law School.

Kristin raised an interesting point. She argued that one of the principal motivations for Justice Breyer’s majority decision relying on practice to allow a broad recess appointment power was a strong reluctance for the Supreme Court to hold that hundreds of recess appointments by Presidents had been unconstitutional.

I am not sure that this Justice Breyer’s real motivation. Another possibility is that he favors a broad recess appointment power because he has a strong sympathy for bureaucracy and bureaucratic efficiency. Bureaucracy gets things done. Politics, like the requirement of Senate confirmation, may impede such efficiency.

But let’s assume that Justice Breyer really was reluctant to hold this presidential practice unconstitutional. Is that a legitimate motivation?

Absolutely not! While it will be harmful to the credibility of the President and the government to acknowledge they were violating the Constitution, it is more important to the Constitution and to the rule of law – as well as the integrity of the Supreme Court – to announce that the government has been violating the law. If the Supreme Court ignores the law – and allows in Justice Scalia’s phrase, an adverse possession constitution – this contributes all the more to an illegal government and to incentivizing the executive to ignore the law.

(Cross posted at the Liberty Law Blog)

Steven D. Smith on Originalism
Michael Ramsey

At Liberty Law Blog, my colleague Steve Smith (guest-blogging for July) asks: Has “Originalism” Lost Its Way?  An excerpt:

The progress of originalism is impressive–and all to the good, I think. And yet I sometimes wonder: somewhere along the way did originalism . . . well, lose sight of its central purpose– of its “original intention,” so to speak. (I have elaborated on some of my reservations here [Ed.: The link is to a great paper called "That Old-Time Originalism"].) The fact that high-profile “progressive” scholars like Michael Perry back in the 1980s and more recently Jack Balkin can convert to originalism without in any way altering their capacious conception of the Court’s role might be a sign that, somewhere along the line, originalism may have gotten off the track.

Of course, more conservative originalists may question whether Perry and Balkin truly deserve to be included in the fellowship at all. But my sense is that Perry and Balkin are in good faith; they don’t seem to be acting as subversive infiltrators or impostors. More importantly, what Perry, Balkin, and other more progressive originalists do seems authorized by originalist orthodoxy. After all, they are merely working from a distinction that even most conservative originalists (not all) insist on– namely, the (ostensible) distinction between “meaning” and “expected applications.” Once you say that the “meaning” of a constitutional provision can deviate from what the enactors expected the provision to do, and can instead incorporate some “principle” or “norm” whose scope and implications the enactors only imperfectly comprehended, there is nothing– nothing in originalism, anyway– to preclude the Perrys and Balkins of the profession from arguing for expansive interpretations that would leave the enactors shuddering in their graves.


Philip Hamburger on Administrative Law (Excerpts) [Updated]
Michael Ramsey

Power Line is running a series of excerpts from Philip Hamburger's book Is Administrative Law Unlawful? .  Here is part 1, part 2 and part 3.

RELATED (via Power Line): Video of Professor Hamburger: Administrative Edicts or the Rule of Law: How Shall We Be Governed?

UPDATE:  Power Line also has this Q&A with Professor Hamburger.  All the responses are interesting but I like this one in particular:

Power Line: Does English legal history provide an analogue or antecedent for administrative law? Is this a case of eternal recurrence?

Philip Hamburger: Sadly, administrative power is not just a modern development. Instead, it appears to be a recurring phenomenon–a part of the long standing tension between absolute power and government through law. Repeatedly over the past thousand years, rulers have attempted to exercise binding power, legislative and judicial, not merely in a regular manner through the law and the courts of law, but also irregularly, through prerogative or administrative commands.

Magna Charta already took a stand against this sort of power. The 1354 and 1368 due process statutes even more emphatically barred it. But English kings persisted in exercising extralegal power until, in the seventeenth century, the English adopted constitutional ideas to put an end to this danger. Similarly, American constitutions barred extralegal power. Nonetheless, it has come to back to life.

The tendency toward extralegal power thus seems to arise not from the nature of modern society, but from the nature of human beings, who always seek more power, if not through law, then outside the law.

Richard Pomp: The Unfulfilled Promise of the Indian Commerce Clause and State Taxation
Michael Ramsey

Richard Pomp (University of Connecticut - School of Law) has posted The Unfulfilled Promise of the Indian Commerce Clause and State Taxation (Tax Lawyer, Vol. 63, No. 4, 2010) on SSRN. Here is an excerpt: 

The Constitution gives Congress the right to “regulate Commerce . . . with the Indian tribes.” Has the Indian Commerce Clause achieved its purpose? Have the Courts interpreted the Clause consistent with Congressional intent? I argue that the answer is, disappointingly, “no.”

The Supreme Court has emasculated and denigrated the Indian Commerce Clause, preventing implementation of the Founders’ vision. The Court has refused to use the Clause as a shield against state taxation.

Chief Justice John Marshall had the opportunity in 1832 in Worcester v. Georgia to shape the Clause into a powerful doctrine. As a ratifier, he was privy to the debates over the Clause. Instead of making the Indian Commerce Clause the centerpiece of his opinion, he used the case as a platform for an eloquent and courageous defense of Indian sovereignty — a thumb in President Jackson’s eye who had initiated the Removal Act of 1830 — just two years before Worcester.

Despite the long discussion in Worcester describing and defending the pre- and extra-constitutional sovereignty doctrine — immunizing the Cherokees from Georgia’s laws — Chief Justice Marshall was apparently worried about resting the opinion on that ground. The jurisdictional constraints on the Court imposed by the Judiciary Act of 1789 required that the case be grounded in the Constitution itself. He needed narrower grounds than the grandiose and sweeping pre- and extra-constitutional concept of Indian sovereignty, especially in a case involving penal laws. It was not enough that the laws of Georgia violated the sovereignty of the Cherokees, he had to show that they were repugnant to the “constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States.”


Ben Wittes on the New York Times and Originalism
Michael Ramsey

At Lawfare, Benjamin Wittes: The New York Times Editorial Page Discovers Originalism—In Japan.  The background is that Japan's prime minister Shinzo Abe wants the Japanese military to be more active; Japan's pacifist constitution seems to pose a barrier, thus apparently requiring a constitutional amendment.  But, the Times complains, "Mr. Abe circumvented that process by having his government reinterpret the Constitution."  Wittes comments:  

It’s interesting how skeptical the Times is about such interpretive methodologies in Japan given its insistence on its own right to reinterpret the U.S. Constitution to mean whatever it wishes on any given day.

James Dawson: Public Danger
Michael Ramsey

James Dawson (Yale Law School JD '14) has posted Public Danger on SSRN. Here is the abstract:

This paper provides the first account of the term “public danger,” which appears in the Grand Jury Clause of the Fifth Amendment. I argue that, in light of historical records from the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the proper reading of “public danger” is a broad one. On this theory, public danger includes not just impending enemy invasions, but also a host of less serious threats (such as financial panics, jail breaks, floods, fires, natural disasters, and plagues). This broad reading is further supported by constitutional history. In 1789, the first Congress rejected an amendment that would have replaced the phrase “public danger” in the proposed text of the Fifth Amendment with the narrower term “public invasion.” Several other tools of interpretation — such as an intratextual analysis of the text of the Constitution and a survey of other legal doctrines that use a “public danger” standard — also counsel in favor of an expansive reading. The paper then unpacks the practical implications of this reading. First, the fact that the Constitution expressly contemplates “public danger” as a gray area between war and peace informs the ongoing scholarly debate about whether the global war on terror is an endless war, a “wartime,” or something else entirely. “Public danger” provides a method of thinking about terrorism that is already built into the Constitution, and therefore calls into question the elaborate but nonconstitutional theories that some scholars have invented to help order our thinking about terrorism. My second argument is that, since the Founders recognized the concept of “public danger” but yet declined to extend enhanced authority to the President during these periods, the Grand Jury Clause may operate as an implicit limitation on executive power in the post-9/11 era. Third, I suggest that a broad reading of public danger would allow Congress to massively expand the jurisdiction of courts martial merely by altering the definition of the phrase “actual service” in the Fifth Amendment.


Randy Barnett on the Declaration of Independence
Michael Ramsey

At Volokh Conspiracy, Randy Barnett: The Declaration of Independence Annotated.  From the conclusion:

The assumption of natural rights expressed in the Declaration of Independence can be summed up by the following proposition:  “first comes rights, then comes government.”  According to this view: (1) the rights of individuals do not originate with any government, but preexist its formation;  (2) The protection of these rights is the first duty of government; and (3) Even after government is formed, these rights provide a standard by which its performance is measured and, in extreme cases, its systemic failure to protect rights — or its systematice violation of rights — can justify its alteration or abolition; (4) At least some of these rights are so fundamental that they are “inalienable,” meaning they are so intimately connected to one’s nature as a human being that they cannot be transferred to another even if one consents to do so.  This is powerful stuff.